Hemp Growing

These elements of urban political economy can be seen as the municipal government’s own organizational environment, which the government and its representatives must attend to in order to maintain their legitimacy, resource flows, and survival. Whether in pursuit of land tenure for community gardens or other public investments in quality of life, residents and community organizations inevitably bump up against large-scale structural constraints—no matter how much access and influence they have with local decision-makers—as they try to change local policy to meet their goals. In recent decades, American governments at all levels from local to national have been affected by the spread of neoliberal ideology, encouraging a turn toward A city’s civic conventions form an important piece of the organizational environment in which community gardening programs develop and define themselves. Yet what is possible for urban agriculture in any given city is also contingent upon its political-economic context. As urban political ecologists would describe it, ideas about appropriate uses for urban space combine with material flows and conditions, as well as ideas governing the legitimacy of governments themselves, in order to determine the actual production of urban socio-nature . In this regard, the distribution and character of urban agriculture in any city is influenced by local economic pressures, the sources and extent of public resources, and political factors at larger scales such as the laws and activities of state and federal governments. These elements of urban political economy can be seen as the municipal government’s own organizational environment, plant grow table which the government and its representatives must attend to in order to maintain their legitimacy, resource flows, and survival.

Whether in pursuit of land tenure for community gardens or other public investments in quality of life, residents and community organizations inevitably bump up against large-scale structural constraints—no matter how much access and influence they have with local decision-makers—as they try to change local policy to meet their goals. A primary set of structural constraints affecting all three cities is their existence in a market economy. In recent decades, American governments at all levels from local to national have been affected by the spread of neoliberal ideology, encouraging a turn toward privatization and new forms of commodification, reduction in taxes and public services, and government intervention to support market processes through deregulation and “entrepreneurial” initiatives . Local governments differ on many fronts, as reflected in the civic conventions they pay homage to, but in the US context they have all been forced into a fiscal squeeze by the reduction of federal funding, and they have confronted this challenge with the shared goal of increasing property values, the local population, and with them the overall prosperity of their local economy . All three case-cities are participants in a globalizing competition to attract capital and “win” at urban growth, and although they vary in their recent histories of “winning” and “losing” the competition for growth, all three cities show how urban growth machine logic and the political-economic pressures on municipalities influence the ways in which urban agriculture has been legitimized as a long-term land use. One common thread is the commodification of nature that runs concurrently with the commodification of land. In each of the case-cities, urban agriculture advocates have taken a different approach to building an economic argument that bolsters the legitimacy of urban agriculture as a land use.

The commonality—bolstering urban agriculture’s legitimacy with an economic rationale—reflects how pervasively market logic is applied to land use in American cities, while the differences between the cases demonstrate variations in how land is commodified based on the local growth coalition’s status in the competition for capital. By drawing attention to the ways that commodification of nature contributes to the production of uneven urban environments, urban political ecology enhances understanding of growth machine dynamics and their impact on the use value available to residents.In a similar vein, urban political ecologists employ the metaphor of urban metabolism to show how the constant reconfiguration of socio-natural space opens up opportunities for transforming relations of power. Addressing the tension between earlier Marxist and more recent actor-network theory approaches within the field of urban political ecology, Heynen highlights the “egalitarian potential that is embedded within a robust conceptualization of urban metabolism” . According to political ecologists, the tendency of nature to reproduce itself freely runs counter to the private property foundations of capitalism, and urban agriculture holds radical potential as an opportunity for people to produce and consume outside of the market, nourishing non-capitalist material flows . However, because the land on which urban agriculture occurs is commodified, I argue that this radical potential is limited in important ways. Urban growers and the spaces they cultivate do contribute to the creative dynamism of socio-natural circulation: they work to reshape the ecology of cities, sustain bodies left undernourished by the capitalist food system, and promote a wider reimagining of urban relations; however, these material and discursive metabolic flows are still subject to the gravity of capitalist property relations and the mutually reinforcing interests of urban growth coalition members.

Asserting the ongoing relevance of Marxist readings of urban political ecology, I show in this chapter how urban political economy serves as an inescapable force influencing land use policy and the decision-making of elected officials. As noted above, in all three cities I investigated, community garden organizations ultimately succeeded in legitimizing urban agriculture as a land use by building narratives that emphasize the potential economic benefits of growing food on vacant lots, a commonality which demonstrates just how strong urban growth and market logics are as governing principles in US cities. Yet there is more to learn from comparing the commodification of nature across the three cases. The economic rationales for urban agriculture developed along distinct trajectories that illustrate how variations in organizational legitimation strategies, local economic conditions, and state-level political contexts combine in the construction of different discursive frames and physical manifestations of urban nature. Comparatively, the local governments in Milwaukee and Philadelphia have faced more acute financial strain in recent decades than the City of Seattle. Milwaukee and Philadelphia have both struggled in the globalized competition for urban growth, while Seattle has largely succeeded. Compounding the effects of reduced federal funding, capital flight has limited the public resources available for social services and urban agriculture investment in both Milwaukee and Philadelphia. Many of the cascading challenges and social maladies are similar for all cities coping with capital flight, but Milwaukee and Philadelphia have diverged in how they construct the role of land in reversing the city’s fortune. In Milwaukee, land is a lifeline that needs to be reserved for potential property tax revenue, while in Philadelphia, land is a liability that has burdened the city budget and deterred development. In Seattle, where the local growth coalition has been winning in the competition to attract capital and the creative class, land has served as a selling point for the city’s livability. The City of Seattle currently has the most public resources available to invest in its community gardens—but upon close inspection, the benefits still accrue unevenly.In Milwaukee, civic conventions that support bottom-up governance facilitated the communication of resident desires regarding urban agriculture, hydroponic table including access to vacant lots and public resources to improve existing projects. As much as city officials are receptive to resident desires and cognizant of the multiple potential ways that urban agriculture works to meet these desires, the scale of poverty in Milwaukee—and legal limitations imposed by state laws—make it difficult for the municipal government to provide consistent financial support for community gardens and similar resident-led initiatives. Facing a severely constrained budget and compounding social problems caused by capital flight and economic decline, the City of Milwaukee is essentially caught doing triage as it attempts to address pressing social problems and attract new investment to regrow its tax base and the economy. Like many cities in the Midwest, Milwaukee has struggled to maintain its economic base with the decline of American manufacturing. In every decade since 1960, the city’s population has decreased, with the most precipitous contraction between 1970 and 1980 when the city lost 11% of its residents. It was during this time that in Milwaukee, as in many other American cities, community gardening received a surge of attention as a strategy to help residents feed themselves amid rising unemployment and higher food costs. Unemployment and poverty persist as major problems in Milwaukee today; the poverty rate is over 25%, and while the unemployment rate has moderately improved to a little under 7% in 2021, the rate for the city’s Black population is almost twice as high . With the decline of the manufacturing sector and inadequate access to transportation, many in Milwaukee—especially on the Near North Side, with the highest concentration of Black residents—cannot commute to what jobs are available .

High unemployment and concentrated poverty have brought on a host of problems including food insecurity, poor health outcomes, crime, and housing instability .Because urban agriculture has been legitimized as a land use and city leaders appreciate potential benefits that the gardens provide, officials have helped gardeners find funding where possible. In addition to the funding from CIP grants described in chapter 3, the Common Council has allocated over $600,000 for beautification and food access initiatives in recent years, some of which has been used to support community gardens. Given the city’s dire fiscal situation, such an amount of money that indicates the impact that urban agriculture organizations have made on the city’s priorities. Without the resources to provide more from the municipal budget, supportive city officials have partnered with other organizations in the region to leverage additional funding for Milwaukee’s community gardens and other green spaces. One source of funding is directly tied to the notion of urban agriculture as a source of employment. In partnership with the county’s federally funded workforce development office, Employ Milwaukee, the City of Milwaukee runs a summer youth employment program called Earn & Learn. Employ Milwaukee pays the wages for young people ages 14-24 who work for local government, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations and gain marketable skills in the process . Groundwork Milwaukee and some individual community gardens participate in Earn & Learn, employing youth to maintain gardens and other green spaces or to prepare and sell food from local urban farms. The organizations could not afford to pay the youth from their own budgets, but they are able to supervise them and provide job training that is considered a valuable workforce development experience by the county, the federal government, and the corporate and philanthropic donors that support Earn & Learn. As governments have reduced their own budgets and the scope of social service provision, the Earn & Learn program is typical of the kind of public-private partnerships that are expanding as the public sector becomes increasingly reliant on nonprofits to fulfill a public service. Furthermore, the fact that “workforce development” is considered a public service at all demonstrates the restructuring of relationships between the public, private and third sectors that has occurred through the influence of neoliberal ideology. With limited resources for the public services of food provision, urban beautification, and community programming, the City of Milwaukee seems to be doing what it can to support these areas as an ancillary benefit of the Earn & Learn workforce training, which is ultimately funded to benefit the private sector. The City of Milwaukee has found another financially motivated partner to support community gardens and other open space investments in the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer District . Like 850 other municipalities in the US, Milwaukee uses a combined sewer system which drains storm water along with sewage and industrial wastewater, creating the risk for sewer overflows during heavy rainfall that presents a “priority water pollution concern” for the federal government . Due to climate change, the Great Lakes region is facing an increased likelihood of heavy rainfall events—and therefore more frequent combined sewer overflows . Because of the potential for being fined by the Environmental Protection Agency when overflows occur, local water utilities with combined sewer systems, especially those in the Great Lakes region, have a serious financial interest in increasing their capacity for storm water management. Working in partnership with the City of Milwaukee, the MMSD and the Fund for Lake Michigan have invested billions of dollars to expand both “grey” and “green” infrastructure for storm water management—not only increasing the capacity of pipes and underground storage tanks, but also adding trees and bioswales and preserving open spaces so that more rainwater can be absorbed into the ground rather than flowing into the sewer system.

When civic conventions are built into the local governance infrastructure, such as the mandates of various agencies or the procedures for urban planning, these formalized conventions are an aspect of the local political opportunity structure. That is, civic conventions involve legal and institutional arrangements that can present openings for social movements to pursue particular policies or decisions . Civic conventions in the form of policy infrastructure create important leverage points for organizations to apply political pressure, while conventions in the form of ideas are important to movement formation and mobilization. Civic conventions are not uniform across the three cities I investigated, yet as this chapter will demonstrate, these features of the local context have played a role in shaping the nature of mobilization to support urban agriculture in all three cases. The political opportunity structure in Milwaukee supported efforts to legitimate gardens through insider strategies to craft and enact supportive policy, while the discursive opportunity structure seemed to suggest less need or opening for widespread mobilization. Philadelphia’s civic conventions created essentially the opposite opportunity structure, in which advocates have successfully organized to build pressure from the outside with narratives about the injustice and inefficiency of the city’s existing policies. In Seattle, both the discursive and political opportunity structures supported the gardeners’ efforts to preserve their sites; periods of both insider and outsider strategies have contributed to the robust, secure, seedling grow rack and thoroughly institutionalized network of gardens Seattle has today.The civic conventions in Milwaukee include a tradition of bottom-up governance that has translated from ideas to infrastructure over time.

As a result, urban agriculture organizations have enjoyed a political opportunity structure favorable to voicing their interests directly to city officials, securing policy improvements and some public resources for their projects, without having to depart from their legitimized role as community benefit organizations. However, as Chapter 4 will explain, public resources in Milwaukee are severely constrained, meaning the city government has ultimately been unable to invest much in garden development or preservation, no matter how legitimate they consider urban agriculture to be. Additionally, the local civic conventions foster an expectation of bottom-up engagement while assuming good governance overall; these civic conventions do not broadly extend to an expectation that citizens should engage in ongoing activism and social movement activities to pressure their government for accountability. In other words, the discursive opportunity structure is less favorable to mobilization in defense of threatened gardens. Overall, Milwaukee’s civic conventions have created opportunities for community-based organizations to use insider advocacy strategies through the existing infrastructure for bottom-up governance, without presenting as much opportunity for organizations to organize a robust social movement to pressure city officials for longer-term garden tenure or greater community control over land use. Historically, Milwaukee was the center of “sewer socialism,” a political movement organized around public investments in physical infrastructure. Between 1910 and 1960, the Socialist Party was highly successful in Milwaukee politics, winning public support in large part because of honest-government platforms and improvements that Socialist officials achieved in sanitation, water and energy systems, and community parks—including the preservation of the Milwaukee lakefront for perpetual public access .

Unlike Socialist Party politics elsewhere, Milwaukee’s Socialist movement was less ideological and more pragmatic. The civic conventions that developed in Milwaukee as a legacy of this era include ideas about good governance, but not as much identification with confrontational “usvs.-them” politics as may be expected for a city with a strong Socialist history. Nevertheless, an ethic of straightforward and transparent policy making in the interest of the general public has endured from the days of sewer socialism, contributing to the development of some bottom-up governance infrastructure. One notable element of the city’s governance infrastructure that serves to actualize resident ideas is the Community Improvement Projects program administered by the Neighborhood Improvement Development Corporation. Through this program, the city provides matching grants of up to $4,000 for resident-proposed projects that “stimulate resident engagement and support sustainable projects within a small geographic area” . Community gardens across the city have won these grants to support garden improvements, increasing the legitimacy of these sites because of the city’s endorsement and financial backing as represented by the CIP award. In recent years, particularly through its Department of Community Development, the City of Milwaukee has paid attention to residents’ ideas and priorities and has brought them into consideration in their urban planning. In 2012 and 2013, the Barrett administration conducted a survey and outreach meetings with residents to develop a sustainability plan for the city. One interviewee stressed that the prevalence of food in public opinion was unexpected: “when surveys have been taken over the years around Milwaukee, and there are issues around sustainability, I think the City people were shocked how much food came up” .

The ReFresh MKE Plan produced in 2013 showed that residents identified “empty lots and abandoned buildings” and “access to healthy food” as two of the city’s greatest sustainability challenges . Furthermore, “Fresh local food” was the single most common response given for “ideas that you think Milwaukee should focus on in its Sustainability Plan.” At the same time as ReFresh MKE was being drafted, the Department of Community Development was compiling a Vacant Lot Handbook with ideas for how residents could work with the city to repurpose unused land, based on examples of existing neighborhood projects that residents had initiated—including community gardens. As they developed these plans with attention to resident activities and priorities, city officials gained appreciation for the potential for urban agriculture to address important public needs. Thus, urban agriculture increased its legitimacy in the eyes of city officials as a tool to address public priorities developed from the bottom up. Adhering to civic conventions supporting governance in the public interest, Milwaukee city officials have been receptive to many proposals related to urban agriculture. The Common Council has approved land transfers to some formally organized community gardens located on unbuildable lots or in the city’s most economically depressed neighborhoods. When Will Allen, a local celebrity and nationally renowned director of Growing Power, sought to build a 5-story vertical farm and urban agriculture center, the city’s planners and Common Council worked with him to make necessary changes to the zoning code. The Common Council also approved a $250,000 forgivable loan for the expansion of Sweet Water Organics, an aquaponics business that hoped to scale up its operations and create more urban agriculture jobs. In 2012, in pursuit of a $5 million award in the Bloomberg Mayors Challenge, a competition to support innovative ideas for city improvement, the Barrett administration sketched out a proposal around addressing foreclosed properties while growing the local food system. When they made it to the semi-final round of the challenge, the administration set up a website to receive project ideas from Milwaukee residents, and then held a public forum to hear presentations for the top ten ideas. In all of these situations, greenhouse growing racks the city showed its interest in urban agriculture and openness to advocates’ proposals for new initiatives. Demonstrating the favorable political opportunity structure for garden advocates in Milwaukee, the city government has also been amenable to broader policy changes that facilitate urban agriculture. In 2010 the Common Council and city planners collaborated with the Milwaukee Food Council to revise the city’s zoning policy in a way that would permit urban agriculture in almost all parts of the city. With government officials so receptive to advocates’ input, the leaders of urban agriculture organizations my not have felt it necessary to mobilize the public around preserving community gardens, as doing so would potentially step outside the city’s civic conventions. While ideas about good governance are widely shared, they largely assume that the city officials will act in the public interest without needing constant vigilance and the pressure from grassroots mobilization and protest. Ideas about the value and need for active civic participation are not as widespread in Milwaukee as, for example, I found them to be in my investigation of Seattle. Over the history of the Milwaukee Urban Gardens / MKE Grows program, gardeners have been asked at a few moments to call or write to their Aldermen or to attend a particular public hearing. However, at no point did the program or other advocates in the city appear to sustain any outsider political strategies, as has occurred in both Seattle and Philadelphia.

Out of the three cities, Milwaukee interviews and archival materials demonstrated the least engagement with neighborhood associations or citizen advisory committees. In my qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews and community documents, codes for civic participation, citizen voice, organizing and mobilization, and political pressure or influence were also the least frequent in Milwaukee documents and interviews, while the code for assumed city support had its highest frequency in Milwaukee. As mentioned above, the city sold some land in its inventory to community gardening groups; this happened between 2013 and 2017, with very little public engagement. In the six Common Council meetings where these land sales were approved, the only people who showed up to speak were the purchasers themselves and Yves LaPierre, an official from the Department of Community Development’s real estate division who manages the city’s garden leases. Apparently, LaPierre’s presence alongside the purchasers served to confer adequate legitimacy on the transaction for it to win council approval. Additional supporters of the purchasing organization, community gardeners or other urban agriculture advocates did not participate in any of the hearings. Their absence aligns with the city’s civic conventions that suggest grassroots political pressure is not a normative aspect of the local public’s civic expectations or repertoire. Indeed, the city has acted favorably toward urban agriculture without much public pressure. With Will Allen forming personal relationships with Mayor Barrett and other city officials and bringing a national spotlight to Milwaukee as a place using urban agriculture to improve people’s lives, government support for urban agriculture appears to have been greater than for other types of resident-driven activity. The city’s multi-million-dollar HOME GR/OWN program demonstrates a belief in the potential of urban agriculture as a community investment. This “catalytic project,” designed to meet goals in the ReFresh MKE sustainability plan, leverages public funds, land and staffing along with private investments and philanthropic support specifically to repurpose vacant lots and help people grow food. In Milwaukee, the prestigious national awards that Will Allen has won for his innovations in urban agriculture have helped to bring urban agriculture additional legitimacy along with that accrued due to the city’s baseline receptivity to resident interests. City officials have come to appreciate how urban agriculture could be used to define the city, attract outside funding, and build the local economy. However, this appreciation has its limits. As Chapter 4 will illustrate, city officials are loath to remove potentially developable properties from the tax rolls by transferring ownership to a tax-exempt organization. Eight out of my 18 interviewees, both garden advocates and city officials, stated this as if it were a matter of fact. One garden program leader, recounting a time when they were previously told to move their garden from a city-owned lot, explained that the city was prioritizing a potential development over the garden “because the city of course is looking at their tax base. And being a nonprofit, whether we purchase the land or whether we’re leasing the land, the city’s not making any money that way” . Like other interviewees from Milwaukee, this program leader took for granted that the city’s primary interest in land use decisions is tax revenue. Widely recognizing the limits to the city’s appreciation for urban agriculture, garden advocates in Milwaukee have rarely mobilized to resist garden removal. Both before and after MUG was established, when particular gardens have faced development threats, the more common reaction has been a sense of inevitability. Thus, while government support for urban agriculture is often assumed in Milwaukee, the people involved in urban agriculture projects understand that support only extends so far. In line with the city’s civic conventions, advocates have used the political opportunity structures available to them, such as Community Improvement Projects funding and the Barrett administration’s receptivity to citizens’ ideas about urban agriculture, to advance pragmatic policies to improve residents’ lives through urban agriculture. However, Milwaukee’s discursive opportunity structure does not support more confrontational strategies or radical, redistributive demands.

While Milwaukee had never made urban agriculture illegal, as many other cities had, gardening activities were still technically constrained in the industrially zoned areas with most of the large vacant lots, so the land use policy task force worked to get the zoning laws changed. Under Wiggins’ leadership, MUG was also able to negotiate longer leases for many of the gardens in its network located on city-owned lots. Longer leases didn’t mean preservation, but for gardeners, having assured access to a site for three years rather than one season at a time increased motivation to invest time and labor into the space and its soil. In its early years, MUG struggled to gain legitimacy as a land trust, but in the process of networking with other organizations and engaging with the public, the organization gradually shifted its goals and eventually gained legitimacy by meeting needs more salient to the community. While MUG was trying to gain legitimacy as a land trust, building its local brand through media coverage, events and advertisements, the organization began to receive requests for different kinds of garden support. Gardeners at existing sites wanted help with maintenance, and some people sought MUG’s help finding or starting a garden near them. As raising large enough sums to purchase land was proving difficult, the organization reoriented its activities toward providing technical support and education about gardening to bolster the function of a growing network of self-organized gardens, grow rack influencing land-use policy and planning, and eventually managing leases with the city for gardens on city-owned parcels. In 2013, MUG’s shift from garden preservation to garden support was solidified by their merger with Groundwork Milwaukee, an organization centered on environmental programming activities and job training for at-risk youth.

The two organizations had been sharing office space with other nonprofit groups at the Milwaukee Environmental Consortium, and they collaborated on projects such as installing a cistern and solar pump for sustainable water access at a MUG-owned garden in 2011. Seeing how much their activities were aligned, the organizations’ leaders decided to join MUG with Groundwork Milwaukee in order to save money on overhead. As MUG’s 2012 annual report explained, “The BIG NEWS for the upcoming year is an agency merger with our sister organization, Groundwork Milwaukee. The anticipated merger will allow MUG to be MORE EFFECTIVE and produce efficiencies that will grow more and better gardens throughout Milwaukee’s neighborhoods” . When the two organizations merged in 2013, and MUG became a program of Groundwork Milwaukee, Antoine Carter had been working as the Membership and Outreach Manager for Groundwork Milwaukee. Since 2011, Carter had coordinated youth activities such as running a young farmers’ CSA and building infrastructure for local community gardens. When Carter became the Program Manager for MUG shortly after the merger, he brought with him the experiences of garden-based youth development and community engagement, plus the perspective of someone who had grown up in the disadvantaged Near North Side of Milwaukee—a first for the organization’s leadership. In 2014, at a University of Wisconsin -Milwaukee panel discussion on “Home and Garden: Can Urban Agriculture Save our Neighborhoods?” Carter introduced MUG as “Milwaukee’s best kept secret” and detailed examples of the gardens that Groundwork Milwaukee was helping to install, explaining how these various sites were transforming their neighborhoods—bringing different groups together in one space, healing community trauma, and inspiring young men like him .

Under Carter’s leadership, MUG continued to coordinate garden leases and help residents start new gardens, while placing a greater emphasis on community engagement and programming—especially activities and job training opportunities for Groundwork Milwaukee’s “Green Team” of paid youth work crews. While MUG had struggled to gain legitimacy as a land trust, the organization found a meaningful role providing garden support and event programming; in the effort to maintain this legitimacy over time, MUG amplified a particular narrative around the benefits of urban agriculture in Milwaukee. Once MUG merged with Groundwork Milwaukee, leveraging public funding and grant sources to employ youth in garden maintenance and service-learning activities became a core function of the program. In its grant applications, media statements and newsletters, the program highlighted the benefits of urban agriculture as a tool for youth development and economic opportunity. MUG was also involved in community building activities, but it did not emphasize these in public communications as much as the youth and employment aspects. Ultimately, while community building remained core to MUG’s work, the framing focused on youth and jobs aligned well with that of other prominent nonprofit organizations in the city that engaged in urban growing, which will be discussed more below.Milwaukee Urban Gardens began by emphasizing its role in defending local gardens from the threat of development and thereby improving quality of life for Milwaukee residents, but this narrative never gained traction , so MUG’s focus shifted over time toward community programming, youth education, and employment as the program gained legitimacy for these activities and systematized its operations in order to maintain that legitimacy.

MUG’s mission continued to be about improving quality of life for Milwaukee residents, but the understanding of how to fulfill that mission evolved from securing permanent gardens to enriching the social life of garden spaces. Having been unable to successfully gain legitimacy for the work of preserving gardens, MUG was concomitantly unable to legitimize urban agriculture as a permanent land use, and today, most of Milwaukee’s community gardens are still vulnerable to development. MUG’s efforts have contributed to longer leases for many of the city-owned garden sites, and increased tenure promotes increased time investment by gardeners who maintain the sites. MUG has undoubtedly helped legitimize urban agriculture in Milwaukee by building a narrative around their value for youth and employment training and by providing the administrative infrastructure that affords gardeners and garden sites more continuity, greenhouse grow tables but this legitimacy does not invoke permanence. Furthermore, some of the lots that MUG purchased opportunistically in its early years are not active as gardens anymore, and they actually pose a slight burden to the organization in terms of property taxes and upkeep. Paradoxically, these empty sites may serve as symbols of urban agriculture’s temporary nature despite being acquired with the goal of permanence. Today, Groundwork Milwaukee engages with city officials regularly in managing leases and water permits for various gardens, but the organization does not appear to be actively pushing for longer land tenure for the sites in its network or mobilizing gardeners to achieve more favorable urban agriculture policy. Two factors that help explain why Groundwork Milwaukee doesn’t emphasize gardener organizing are the local civic conventions, which will be discussed more in chapter 3, and the wider organizational context of urban agriculture in Milwaukee. As noted above, MUG was not the first organization to oversee community gardens in Milwaukee; it was also not the most prominent in legitimizing and advocating for urban agriculture in the city. That distinction goes to Growing Power, a nonprofit urban farm with national renown. Growing Power’s founder, Will Allen, along with the leaders of other nonprofits such as Walnut Way, has played a large role in shaping the city’s relationship with urban agriculture. Allen started Growing Power in 1993, and as the organization grew it increasingly focused on addressing problems in its near north-side neighborhood by engaging at-risk youth and offering jobs to hard-to-employ people such as those with a criminal record, all in order to sell fresh produce affordably. Along with his innovative aquaponic growing techniques, this model earned Allen significant awards, including a Ford Leadership for a Changing World award in 2005 and a MacArthur Genius Grant in 2008. As noted above, in addition to Growing Power and MUG, other local organizations have contributed to the legitimacy of and appreciation for urban agriculture as a land use in Milwaukee. The Walnut Way Conservation Corporation, a community development corporation focused on revitalizing the Lindsay Heights neighborhood on Milwaukee’s Near North Side, has also elevated the status of urban agriculture locally. Beginning in the 1990s, founders Sharon and Larry Adams organized the installation of community gardens and orchards at the request of neighborhood residents, who wanted to grow peaches and do something positive with vacant lots. From this network of agricultural spaces, Walnut Way now sells produce, canned goods, and value-added products to Milwaukee residents and restaurants. They employ youth and formerly incarcerated people in landscaping as well as agriculture and food production, providing job training and economic development while transforming the physical appearance of the neighborhood.

As with MUG and Growing Power, Walnut Way has maintained legitimacy in part by its emphasis on job training, which has further solidified the local understanding of urban agriculture as beneficial for its workforce development potential. Another organization often mentioned as a source of legitimacy for urban agriculture in Milwaukee is Victory Gardens Initiative . Since 2009, VGI has organized an annual “garden blitz” during which hundreds of volunteers install up to 500 gardens in backyards across Milwaukee and some of its suburbs. They also manage a 1.5-acre urban farm in the Harambee neighborhood on Milwaukee’s Near North Side. After VGI had leased their farm space for four years through the MUG program, they were able to purchase the parcel from the city—one of only a handful of such cases in which the city sold land for permanent nonprofit-run urban agriculture. In 2013, during the public hearing for the proposed land sale, Alderman Milele Coggs, whose district includes the land in question, called VGI’s farm “great work that’s been done that’s helped the neighborhood and that is a shining example of what can be done with green space in urban areas” . The farm includes an orchard and scale production beds for sale to restaurants and for free distribution to the local community. There is also a community gathering space on the site, along with individual garden plots available for interested community members. VGI uses the site to grow and distribute a significant amount of organic produce, but according to an employee interviewed, their primary mission is actually related to education: they teach neighborhood children, youth in service-learning programs, and other volunteers about organic food production. Yet again, a primary strategy that this organization has used to attract resources and sustain itself over time has to do with youth development, further legitimizing urban agriculture as a vehicle for job training. Walnut Way and VGI are organizations that operate well-known community gardens as a vehicle to fulfill their larger missions, and these organizations have garnered a great deal of media coverage and local recognition for urban agriculture even though it is only one component of their work. The UW Milwaukee County Extension has also operated a network of community gardens since 1978, as noted above; this program, too, has received a lot of positive press coverage, especially in its early years. Over time, the program has tended to operate more on county land outside the city limits, but as a partner to other organizations in the city it has still formed an important part of the local urban agriculture milieu. The situation in Philadelphia is different, in part due to differences in the history of how community gardens have been supported. While gaining legitimacy was a major challenge for Milwaukee Urban Gardens, the same was not true for Philadelphia’s main garden organization. The Pennsylvania Horticultural Society had nearly 150 years of history and a well developed reputation by the time it established the Philadelphia Green program in 1973. The organization’s leader at the time, Ernesta Ballard, is described by many as a visionary; she certainly helped the organization maintain its relevance in changing times when she pushed for the creation of Philadelphia Green. Long known for producing the Philadelphia Flower Show and providing a venue for suburban socialites to show off their horticultural panache, PHS ventured in a different direction with Philadelphia Green by helping urban residents build gardens on vacant lots. In 1978, explaining why PHS was spending $100,000 from its operating budget on the Philadelphia Green program, Ballard explained, “Our people love the program because it gets rid of their guilt about the inner city… It allows them to help people” . This statement reveals a foundational truth about the Philadelphia Green program: the critical audience from which organization leaders sought legitimacy was the PHS donor base rather than the urban gardeners.

The crew bosses are under constant supervision from the crop managers, although they can take short bathroom breaks and they often carry on light-hearted conversations with coworkers. Most crew bosses are US Latinos, with a few mestizo Mexicans and one Mixteco indigenous Oaxacan. They live in the insulated, year-round labor camp. Some of the crew bosses call the Oaxacan workers derogatory names. The crew boss most often accused by pickers of such racist treatment has a daughter, Barbara, who is also a crew boss. Barbara is a bilingual Latina from Texas in her early twenties who has worked the harvest at the farm for 11 years. She attends a community college in Texas every spring and hopes to become a history teacher. She is upset that other crew bosses call Oaxacan people pinche Oaxaco or Indio estupido . She explains to me that Oaxacans are afraid to complain or demand better working conditions because they do not want to lose their jobs. She describes a farm policy stating that if a crew boss fires a picker, they can never be hired by anyone else on the farm. She explains, ‘‘It’s unfair. I think there should be checks and balances.’’ Her family learned English in Texas as well as in the farm-sponsored English classes each night after work. The farm executives intend for these classes to be open to anyone on the farm. Others on the farm believe that the courses are open to all workers except pickers. This unofficial, yet effective exclusion of pickers from the English classes inadvertently shores up segregation on the farm.Pickers are the only group not paid by the hour. Instead, they are considered ‘‘contract workers’’ and are paid a certain amount per pound of fruit harvested. Most live in the camp furthest from farm headquarters and some live in the next furthest camp. Each day, they are told a minimum amount of fruit to pick. If they pick less, they are fired and kicked out of the camp.

The first contract picker I met, a Triqui man named Abelino, explained, ‘‘The hourly jobs, the salaried jobs are better because you can count on how much you will make. But, they don’t give those jobs to us.’’ Approximately 25 people, greenhouse benches mostly mestizo Mexican with a few Mixteco and Triqui people, pick apples. The field boss, Abby, explained to me that picking apples is the hardest job on the farm. Apple pickers work 5 to 10 hours a day, 7 days a week, carrying a heavy bag of apples over their shoulders. They repeatedly climb up and down ladders to reach the apples. This job is sought after because it is known to be the highest paid picking position. However, the majority—350 to 400—of pickers, often called simply ‘‘farm workers,’’ work in the strawberry fields for one month, followed by three months in the blueberry fields. Other than a few Mixtecos, they are almost all Triqui men, women, and children; agricultural workers can legallybe 14 years or older. Most pickers come with other family members. The official contract for strawberry pickers is 14 cents per pound of strawberries. This means that pickers must bring in 50 pounds of de-leafed strawberries every hour because the farm is required to pay Washington State minimum wage . In order to meet this minimum, pickers take few or no breaks from 5 a.m. until the afternoon when that field is completed. Nonetheless, they are often reprimanded and called perros , burros, Oaxacos, or indios estupidos. Many do not eat or drink before work so they do not have to take time to use the bathroom. They work as hard and fast as they can, arms flying in the air as they kneel in the dirt, picking and running with their buckets of berries to the checkers. Although they are referred to as ‘‘contract workers,’’ this is misleading. The pay per unit may be changed by the crop managers without warning or opportunity for negotiation. Strawberry pickers work simultaneously with both hands in order to make the minimum. They pop off the green stem and leaves from each strawberry and avoid the green and the rotten berries. During my fieldwork, I picked once or twice a week and experienced gastritis, headaches, and knee, back, and hip pain for days afterward.

I wrote in a field note after picking, ‘‘It honestly felt like pure torture.’’ Triqui pickers work seven days a week, rain or shine, without a day off until the last strawberry is processed. Occupying the bottom of the ethnic-labor hierarchy, Triqui pickers bear an unequal share of health problems, from idiopathic musculoskeletal pains to slipped vertebral disks, from type 2 diabetes to premature births and developmental malformations . Most Triqui workers on this farm are from one village, San Miguel, located in the mountains of Oaxaca, Mexico. Next, I highlight the economic and physical hardships of the pickers on the farm and on the US-Mexico border, touching on the importance of language, ethnicity, and education in the organization of the farm labor hierarchy. I also indicate the importance of immigration and border policies in determining the structural vulnerability of farm workers. Marcelina is a 28-year-old Triqui mother of two. A local non-profit organized a seminar on farm labor for which I invited Marcelina to speak about her experiences migrating and picking. Shyly, she approached the translator, holding her one year-old daughter, speaking in Spanish, her second language.My first day picking, the only people who picked as slowly as I did were two Latina US citizen girls from California and one Latino US citizen manwho commuted from Seattle. After the first week, the two Latina girls began picking into the same bucket in order to make the minimum and keep one paycheck. The second week, I no longer saw the man from Seattle. I asked a supervisor where he had gone, assuming he had decided the work was too difficult and given up. She told me the farm made a deal with him that if he could make it through a week picking, they would give him a job paid hourly in the processing plant. He has been ‘‘one of the hardest workers’’ in the plant since then. I inquired as to why indigenous Mexicans could not get processing plant jobs. The supervisor replied, ‘‘People who live in migrant camps cannot have those jobs, they can only pick.’’ She considered it farm policy without any need for explanation. Thus, marginalization begets marginalization. Structural vulnerability increases along the labor hierarchy and is reinforced by official and unofficial policies, practices, and prejudices .

The indigenous Mexicans live in the migrant camps because they do not have the resources to rent apartments in town. Because they live in the camps, they are given only the worst jobs on the farm. Unofficial farm policies subtly reinforce labor and ethnic hierarchies. These profiles show that the position of the Triqui workers at the bottom of the hierarchy is multiply determined by poverty, education level, language, citizenship status, and ethnicity. In addition, these factors produce each other. For example, a family’s poverty cuts short an individual’s education, which limits one’s ability to learn Spanish , which limits one’s ability to leave the bottom rung of labor and housing. Poverty, at the same time, is determined in large part by the institutional racism at work against Triqui people in the first place. Segregation on the farm is the result of a complex system of feedback and feedforward loops organized around these multiple nodes. Late in my second summer on the farm, the pickers walked out of the field just after the pay per weight was lowered. The pickers listed over 20 grievances about the working conditions, growers equipment from low pay to racist statements from supervisors, lack of lunch breaks to unfair promotions of mestizo and Latino workers over indigenous pickers. Over the next week, several executives and a dozen pickers held meetings to discuss the grievances. The executives were visibly surprised and upset at the explicit racist treatment and differential promotions on the farm. They promptly instructed the crop managers to pass along the message to treat all workers respectfully. Lunch breaks and higher pay were instituted, but were silently rescinded the following summer. The pickers called the document a ‘‘contract’’ and requested signatures from the executives. The farm president filed it as a ‘‘memo.’’ This strike, the temporary nature of its results, and the conversion of the contract into a memo highlight the differential demands and pressures at all levels of the farm hierarchy. The executives demand that all workers aretreated with respect at the same time that their real anxieties over farm survival prohibit them from effectively addressing the primary, economic concerns of the pickers. Although everyone on the farm works for and is paid by the same business, they do not share vulnerability evenly. The pay and working conditions of the pickers function as variables semicontrollable by the farm executives as partial buffers between market changes and the viability of the rest of the farm.Responsibilities, stressors, and privileges differ from the top to the bottom of this hierarchy.

Everyone on the farm is structurally vulnerable, although the characteristics and depth of vulnerability change depending on one’s position within the labor structure. Control decreases and anxieties accumulate as one moves down the pecking order. Those at the top worry about market competition and the weather. The middleResponsibilities, stressors, and privileges differ from the top to the bottom of this hierarchy. The workers on every level of the ladder worry about factors over which they lack control. Everyone on the farm is structurally vulnerable, although the characteristics and depth of vulnerability change depending on one’s position within the labor structure. Control decreases and anxieties accumulate as one moves down the pecking order. Those at the top worry about market competition and the weather. The middlemanagers worry about these factors as well as about how they are treated by their bosses. The pickers also worry about picking the minimum weight in order to avoid losing their job and their housing. The higher one is positioned in the structure, the more control over time one has . The executives and managers can take breaks as their workload and discretion dictate. The administrative assistants and checkers can take short breaks, given their supervisor’s consent or absence. The field workers can take infrequent breaks if they are willing to sacrifice pay, and even then they may be reprimanded. The higher one is located in the hierarchy, the more one is paid. The executives and managers are financially secure with comfortable homes. The administrative staff and checkers are paid minimum wage and live as members of the rural working class in relatively comfortable housing. The pickers are paid piecemeal and live in labor camp shacks. They are constantly aware of the risk of losing even this poor housing. Among pickers, those in strawberries make less money and are more likely tomiss the minimum and be fired than those in apples. This segregation is not conscious or willed on the part of the executives or managers. Rather, inequalities and the anxieties they produce are driven by larger structural forces. While farm executives are vulnerable to macro-social structures, vulnerability is further conjugated through ethnicity and citizenship, changing character from the top to the bottom of the labor hierarchy . Bodies are organized according to the social categories of ethnicity and citizenship into superimposed hierarchies of labor possibilities and housing conditions. The overdetermination of the adverse lot of indigenous Mexican migrant berry pickers tracks along the health disparities seen throughout the public health literature on migrant workers . The focus on risk and risk behaviors in public health and medicine carries with it a subtle assumption that the genesis of vulnerability and suffering is the individual and his or her choices . This focus often leads to blaming inadvertently the individual victim or their ‘‘culture’’ for their structurally produced suffering . Public health and medical interventions are planned with the goal of changing individual choices, behaviors, and values. The concept of structural vulnerability, on the other hand, refocuses our analysis onto the social structure as the locus of danger, damage, and suffering. Without such a concept, diagnoses and interventions rarely correspond with the context of suffering and may instead comply with the very structures of inequality producing the suffering in the first place .

Among these farmers that responded with a list of key nutrients, some talked about having their nutrients “lined up” as part of their fertility program. This approach involved keeping nutrients “in balance,” such as for example, monitoring pH to ensure magnesium levels did not impact calcium availability to plants. These farmers also emphasized that though nitrogen represented a key nutrient and was important to consider in their farm operation, tracking soil nitrogen levels was less important than other aspects of soil management, such as promoting soil biological processes, maintaining adequate soil moisture and aeration, or planting cover crops regularly. As one farmer put it, “if you add nutrients to the soil, and the biology is not right, the plants will not be able to absorb it.” Or, as another farmer emphasized, “It’s not about adding more [nitrogen]… I try to cover crop more too.” A third farmer emphasized, that “I don’t use any fertilizers because I honestly don’t believe in adding retroactively to fix a plant from the top down.” This same farmer relied on planting a cover crop once per year in each field, and discing that cover crop into the ground to ensure his crops were provided with adequate nitrogen for the following two seasons. While most farmers readily listed key nutrients, several farmers shifted conversation away from focusing on nutrients. These farmers generally found that this interview question missed the mark with regards to soil fertility. One farmer responded, “I’m not really a nutrient guy.” This same farmer added that he considered [soil fertility] a soil biology issue as much as a chemistry issue.” The general sentiment among these farmers emphasized that soil fertility was not about measuring and “lining up” nutrients, grow lights for cannabis but about taking a more holistic approach.

This approach focused on facilitating conditions in the soil and on-farm that promoted a soil-plant-microbe environment ideal for crop health and vigor. For example, the same farmer quoted above mentioned the importance of establishing and maintaining crop root systems, emphasizing that “if the root systems of a crop are not well established, that’s not something I can overcome just by dumping more nitrogen on the plants.” Another farmer similarly emphasized that they simply created the conditions for plants to “thrive,” and “have pretty much just stepped back and let our system do what it does; specifically, we feed our chickens whey-soaked wheat berries and then we rotate our chickens on the field prior to planting. And we cover crop.” A third farmer also maintained that their base fertility program—a combination of planting a cover crop two seasons per year, an ICLS chicken rotation program, minimal liquid N-based fertilizer addition, and occasionally compost application—all worked together to “synergize with biology in the soil.” This synergy in the soil created by management practices—rather than focusing on nutrient levels—guided this farmer’s approach to building and assessing soil fertility on-farm. Another farmer called this approach “place-based” farming. This particular farmer elaborated on this concept, saying “I think the best style of farming is one where you come up with a routine [meaning like a fertility program] that uses resources you have: cover crops, waste materials beneficial to crops, animals” in order to build organic matter, which “seems to buffer some of the problems” that this farmer encountered on their farm.

Similar to other farmers, this farmer asserted that adding more nitrogen-based fertilizer did not lead to better soil fertility or increase yields, in their direct experience. Regardless of whether farmers listed key nutrients, a majority of farmers voiced that nitrogen was not a big concern for them on their farm. This sentiment was shared among most farmers in part because they felt the amount of nitrogen additions from fertilizers they added were insignificant compared to nitrogen additions by conventional farms. Farmers also emphasized that the amount of nitrogen they were adding was not enough to cause environmental harm; relatedly, a few farmers noted the absurdity and added economic burden of the recent nitrogen management plan requirements—specifically among organic farms with very low N-based fertilizer application. The majority of farmers also expressed that their use of cover crops and the small amount of N-based fertilizer additions as part of their soil fertility program ensured on-farm nitrogen demands were met for their crops. Across all farmers interviewed, cover cropping served as the baseline and heart of each fertility program, and was considered more effective than additional N-based fertilizers at maintaining and building soil fertility. Farmers used a range of cover crop species and often applied a mix of cover crops, including vetches and other legumes like red clover and cowpea , grains and cereals like oats . Farmers cited several reasons for the effectiveness of cover cropping, such as increased organic matter content, more established root systems, greater microbial activity, better aeration and crumble in their soils, greater number of earthworms and arthropods, improved drainage in their soils, and more bioavailable N.

Whereas farmers agreed that “more is not better” with regards to N-based fertilizers, farmers did agree that allocating more fields for planting cover crops over the course of the year was beneficial in terms of soil fertility. However, as one farmer pointed out, while cover crops provide the best basis for an effective soil fertility program, this approach is not always economically viable or physically possible. Several farmers expressed concern because they often must allocate more fields to cover crops than cash crops in any given season, which means that their farm operation requires more land to be able to produce the same amount of vegetables than if they had all their fields in cash crops. Farmers also shared that in some circumstances, such as in early spring, they are not able to realize the full potential of a winter cover crop if they are forced to mow the cover crop early to plant cash crops and ensure the harvest timeline of a high-value summer vegetable crop. The cover crop approach to soil fertility takes “persistence,” as one farmer emphasized; another farmer similarly pointed out that the benefits of cover cropping “are not always realized in the crop year. You’re in it [organic agriculture] for the long haul, there is no quick fix.” Indeed, farmers who choose to regularly plant cover crops to build soil fertility, rather than just add N-based fertilizers, reported that they came up against issues of land tenure and access to land, market pressures, and long-term economic sustainability. To build on conversations about soil fertility, farmers also provided responses to interview questions that asked them to elaborate on the usefulness of available soil tests to gauge soil fertility more broadly—and then more specifically, the usefulness of soil tests in informing their soil fertility program and/or management approaches on-farm. Overall, only three of 13 farmers reported regularly using and relying on soil tests to inform their soil fertility program or aspects of their farm operation. These farmers offered very short responses and did not elaborate. For example, one farmer shared that they “test twice a year in general,” and that they “rely on the results of the soil tests to tweak [their] fertility program.” Another farmer said briefly, “We use soil tests… we utilize them to decide what to do to try to improve the soil.” A third farmer admitted that though he “used to do a soil test every year, literally used to spend hundreds of dollars per year on soil tests,” he found that the results of soil tests did not change year-to-year and were, as he put it, very “stable.” This particular farmer no longer regularly uses or relies on soil testing for their farm operation. The remaining ten farmers confirmed that they had previously submitted a soil test, usually once and most often to a local commercial lab in the region. These farmers expressed a range of sentiments when asked about the usefulness of soil tests, including disappointment, distrust, or both, particularly in the capacity of soil tests to inform soil fertility on their farm. Some farmers said directly, “I just don’t trust soil tests,” or “frankly, I don’t believe a lot in soil testing because it’s too standardized,” indoor cannabis grow system while other farmers initially stated they had used “limited” or “infrequent” soil tests, and then later admitted that they did not use or rely on soil tests on their farm operation. These farmers tended to focus on the limitations of soil tests that they encountered for their particular farm application. Limitations of soil tests discussed by farmers varied. Farmers stated that soil tests often confirmed what they already knew about their soil and did not add new information. For this reason, some farmers used results from a soil test as a guide, while other farmers found results to be redundant and therefore less useful to their farm operation.

Because issues with soil fertility were sometimes linked to inherent soil characteristics within a particular field, such as poor drainage or heavily sandy soil, farmers found that soil tests were not able to provide new insight to overcome these environmental limitations. “I’m not able to correct that environmental limitation [ie, poor drainage] by adding more nitrogen,” one farmer emphasized. A different farmer echoed this sentiment, saying that “I’m not going to magically get rid of issues that soil tests show… I can only slightly move the needle, no matter what I do.” Most farmers recognized that soil tests produced inconsistent results because of differences in timing and location of sampling. As one farmer noted, “You can take the same sample a couple months apart from the same field and get very different results.” Likewise, another farmer shared that, “I still struggle with the fact that I can send in two different soil tests and get two very different results. To me that seems like the science is not there.” Farmers also emphasized that each of their “fields are all so different” with “a lot of irregularity in [their] soil.” According to several farmers, soil tests did not account for variations in soil texture and soil structure, despite their observations of the influence of both edaphic characteristics on soil test results. For example, one farmer pointed out that fields that were plowed or were previously furrow irrigated created marked differences in soil test results. Similarly, another farmer shared that if a sample for soil testing was taken from an irregular patch in a field with heavier clay, differences in soil texture across samples skewed soil test results. If a systematic sampling approach was not considered, several farmers emphasized that results of soil tests might be “misleading.” Another source of inconsistency that farmers voiced stemmed from variation in protocols used across different labs that processed soil samples. One farmer stated that in their experience, “soil tests are not really accurate, because if I use a different lab, a different person [ie, consultant] doing the soil test, it’s all different.” For example, one farmer pointed out that they do not use soluble forms of nitrogen, and instead relied on their animal rotations and cover crops to supply nutrients as part of their fertility program; this farmer emphasized that, “I think we need to get to a place with soil testing where it would be more applicable or be more accurately useful for a farm like mine. For example, with soil testing, if the standards you’re setting, and the markers you’re setting are based on farms that are putting fertilizer on the soil, I don’t think my numbers are going match up. PCA indicated strong relationships among several key management variables; the results of the PCA also provided strong differentiation among farms along the first two principal components, which together accounted for 77.4% of the variability across farms . The first principal component explained 55.1% of the variation, and the second component explained 22.3% of the variation observed across all farms. Both components had eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Additional N-based fertilizer represented the management variable most associated with PC 1—followed by tillage, and inversely ICLS. While crop diversity, cover crop frequency, and crop rotation patterns also contributed to the overall variation explained by PC 1, these management variables were weaker in comparison to N-based fertilizer additions, ICLS, and tillage. On the other hand, variables with the strongest contribution to PC 2 were crop diversity, cover crop frequency, and crop rotation patterns.

This approach increased the production pool as little as possible while also ensuring sufficient enrichment of the NH4 + and NO3 – pools with 15N-NH4 + and 15N-NO3, respectively, to facilitate high measurement precision . Due to significant variability of initial NH4 + and NO3 – pool sizes in each soil sample, differing amounts of tracer solution were added to each sample set evenly across the soil surface. To begin the incubation, each of the four sub-samples received the tracer solution via evenly distributed circular drops from a micropipette. After four hours , two sub-sample incubations were stopped by extraction with 0.5M K2SO4 as above for initial NH4 + and NO3 – concentrations. Filters were pre-rinsed with 0.5 M K2SO4 and deionized water and dried in a drying oven at 60°C to avoid the variable NH4 + contamination from the filter paper. Soil extracts were frozen at -20°C until further isotopic analysis. Similarly after 24 hrs , two sub-sample incubations were stopped by extraction as previously detailed, and subsequently frozen at -20°C. At a later date, filtered extracts were defrosted, homogenized, and analyzed for isotopic composition of NH4 + and NO3 – in order to calculate gross production and consumption rates for N mineralization and nitrification. We prepared extracts for isotope ratio mass spectrometry using a microdiffusion approach based on Lachouani et al. . Briefly, to determine NH4 + pools, 10mL aliquots of samples were diffused with 100mg magnesium oxide into Teflon coated acid traps for 48 hours on an orbital shaker.

The traps were subsequently dried, spiked with 20μg NH4+ -N at natural abundance to achieve optimal detection, vertical grow system and subjected to EA-IRMS for 15N:14N analysis of NH4 + . Similarly, to determine NO3 – pools, 10mL aliquots of samples were diffused with 100mg magnesium oxide into Teflon coated acid traps for 48 hours on an orbital shaker. After 48 hours, acid traps were removed and discarded, and then each sample diffused again with 50mg Devarda’s alloy into Teflon coated acid trap for 48 hours on an orbital shaker. These traps were dried and subjected to EA-IRMS for 15N:14N analysis of NO3 + . Twelve dried samples with very low spiked with 20μg NH4+ -N at natural abundance to achieve optimal detection.In addition to the soil biogeochemical variables described above, farmers were also interviewed to determine specific soil management practices on their farms. Farmers were asked to describe the number of tillage passes they performed per field per season; the total number of crops per acre that the farm produced during one calendar year at the whole farm level; the degree to which the farm utilized integrated crop and livestock systems on the farm; crop rotational complexity for each field; and the frequency of cover crop plantings for each field. To calculate the frequency of tillage, we tallied the total number of tillage passes per season for each field. To calculate crop abundance, the total number of crops grown per year at the whole farm level was divided by the total acreage farmed. To capture the use of ICLS, we created an index based on the number of and type of animals utilized. Specifically, the index was calculated by first adding the number of animals used in rotation on farm for each animal type and then dividing by the total number of acres for each farm. These raw values were then normalized, creating an index range from 0 to 1 .

Lastly, to quantify crop rotational complexity, a rotational complexity index was calculated for each site using the formula outlined by Socolar et al. . Cover crop frequency was determined using the average number of cover crop plantings per year, calculated as cover crop planting counts over the course of two growing years for each field site.In order to identify farm typologies based on indicators for soil organic matter levels, we first used several clustering algorithms. First, a k-means cluster analysis based on four key soil indicators—soil organic matter , total soil nitrogen, and available nitrogen —was used to generate three clusters of farm groups using the facoextra and cluster packages in R . The cluster analysis results were divisive, nonhierarchical, and based on Euclidian distance, which calculates the straight-line distance between the soil indicator combinations of every farm site in Cartesian space , and created a matrix of these distances . To determine the appropriate number of clusters for the cluster analysis, a scree plot was used to signal the point at which the total within-cluster sum of squares decreased as a function of the increasing cluster size. The location of the kink in the curve of this scree plot delineated the optimal number of clusters, in this case three clusters . To further explore appropriate cluster size, we used a histogram to determine the structure and spread of data among clusters. A Euclidean-based dendrogram analysis was then used to further validate the results of the cluster analysis. In addition to confirming the results of the cluster analysis, the dendrogram plot showed relationships between sites and relatedness across all sites. To visual cluster analysis results, the final three clusters were plotted based on the axes produced by the cluster analysis. One drawback of cluster analyses is that there is no measure of whether the groups identified are the most effective combination to explain clusters produced by soil indicators, or whether they are statistically different from one another.

To address this gap, we used ANOSIM to evaluate and compare the differences between clusters identified with the cluster analysis above. We calculated the global similarity in addition to pairwise tests of each cluster. To formally establish the three farm types and also make the functional link between organic matter and management explicit, we used the three clusters that emerged from the k-means cluster analysis based on soil organic matter indicators, and explored differences in management approaches among the clusters. We then created three farm types based on this exploratory analysis. Specifically, we first analyzed management practices among sites within each cluster to determine if similarities in management approaches emerged for each cluster. Based on this analysis, we used the three clusters from the cluster analysis to create three farm types categorized by soil organic matter levels and informed by management practices applied. Using the three farm types from above, we then analyzed whether our classification created strong differences along soil texture and management gradients using a linear discriminant analysis . LDA is most frequently used as a pattern recognition technique; because LDA is a supervised classification, class membership must be known prior to analysis . The analysis tests the within group covariance matrix of standardized variables and generates a probability of each farm sites being categorized in the most appropriate group based on these variable matrices . To characterize soil texture, we used soil texture class . To characterize soil management, we used crop abundance, tillage frequency, vertical grow system and crop rotational complexity—the three management variables with the strongest gradient of difference among the three farm types. A confusion matrix was first applied to determine if farm sites were correctly categorized among the three clusters created by the cluster analysis. Additional indicator statistics were also generated to confirm if the LDA was sensitive to input variables provided. A plot with axis loadings is provided to visualize the results of the LDA and display differences across farm groups visually. The LDA was carried out using the MASS R package. To build on the results of the LDA, we performed a variation partitioning analysis to determine the level of variation in soil organic matter indicators explained by the soil texture variables, soil management variables, and their interactions . VPA was performed using the vegan package in R . Using indicator variables for soil organic matter levels, we performed a k-means cluster analysis to develop a meaningful classification of farms. Scree plot results indicated that three clusters produced the most consistent separation of field sites. As shown in Figure 1, the two dimensional cluster analysis produced a strong first dimension , which explained 86.7% of the separation among the 27 field sites. Total N, total C, POXC, and soil protein variables strongly explained this separation of farm types, as shown by the lack of overlap among the clusters along the Dimension 1 axis. Histogram results provide a visual summary of linear difference among the three clusters and further confirms minimal overlap among clusters; however, Cluster I and Cluster II fields showed low dissimilarity between values 0 and -2 . Results from the average distance-based linkages of the dendrogram analysis similarly further established the accuracy of field site groupings determined by the cluster analysis. These results indicated that Cluster II sites were more closely related to Cluster III sites compared to Cluster I sites . ANOSIM showed strongly significant global differences among the three clusters , where a value of 1 delineates 0% overlap between clusters.

Overall, ANOSIM verified the farm types obtained from the cluster analysis. In addition, ANOSIM pairwise t-tests that compared each individual cluster in pairs confirmed strongly significant dissimilarities between Cluster I and Cluster III sites . ANOSIM pairwise t-tests also indicated that Cluster I sites were significantly divergent from Cluster II sites; however, Cluster I and Cluster II showed less dissimilarities than Cluster II and Cluster III sites . ANOSIM pairwise t-test results were in congruence with the results provided by the histogram . Classification of farm sites using k-means clustering closely matched differences in on-farm management approaches . It is important to note that while general trends between clusters and management emerged, the management practices analyzed here do not fully encompass the management regimes of each farm field site, and are intended to be exploratory rather than definitive. Several general trends emerged across the three farm types . For instance, Farm Type I, comprised of six field sites, consisted of fields with higher crop abundance values and fields that more frequently planted cover crops compared to Farm Type III. These sites used lower impact machines and applied a lower number of tillage passes compared to Farm Type II and III. In contrast, Farm Type II, also comprised of six field sites, and Farm Type III, comprised of fifteen field sites, represented fields on the lower end of crop abundance values and sites that applied cover crop plantings at a lower frequency than Farm Type I. Farm Type III on average applied a higher number of tillage passes and on average were on the lower end of ICLS index compared to both Farm Type I and Farm Type II. In general, Farm Type II used management approaches that frequently overlapped with Farm Type III, and less frequently overlapped with Farm Type I. Overall, farm types significantly differentiated based on indicators for soil organic matter levels . For all four indicators displayed in Figure 2, differences among the three farm types were highly significant . As visualized in the side-by-side box plot comparisons for all four indicators for soil organic matter levels, Farm Type I consistently showed the highest mean values across all four indicators, while Farm Type III consistently showed the lowest mean values across all four indicators. Farm Type I had mean values of 0.21 mg-N kg-soil-1 for total soil N, 2.3 mg-C kg-soil-1 for total organic C, 787 mg-C kg-soil-1 for POXC, and 7.4 g g-soil-1 for soil protein; compared to Farm Type I, Farm Type III had means values 43% lower for total soil N, 48% lower for total organic C, 58% for POXC, and 66% lower for soil protein. Compared to Farm Type I, Farm Type II had mean values 38% lower for total soil N, 26% lower for total organic C, 28% lower for POXC, and 30% lower for soil protein than Farm Type I. Standard errors for all four indicators are shown in Figure 2.This on-farm study found significant differentiation among the organic farm field sites sampled based on soil organic matter levels—and created a gradient in soil quality among the three farm types. While we found that differences in soil quality were generally aligned with trends in management among sites, soil texture—rather than management—emerged as the stronger driver of soil quality. Though initially, we found that net and gross N cycling rates were not significantly different across farm types, gross N cycling rates showed considerable variation among farm types.

The Farmer First approach recognizes multiple knowledge forms and challenges the standard “information transfer” pipeline model that is often applied in research and extension contexts . We used an open-ended, qualitative approach that relied on in-depth and in-person interviews to study farmer knowledge. Such methods are complementary to surveys that use quantitative methods for capturing a large sample of responses . Because they are more open-ended, qualitative approaches allow for more unanticipated directions ; however, as Scoones and Thompson point out, removing local knowledge from its local context and attempting to fit it into the constrictive framework of Western scientific rationality is likely to lead to significant errors in interpretation, assimilation, and application. While interviews are not able to capture the quantity of farmer input that surveys do, in-depth interviews allow researchers to access a deeper knowledge base that has inherent value—despite limitations in scalability and/or transferability—as participants respond in their own words, using their own categorization, and perceived associations . Such in-depth interviews are therefore essential to research on farmer knowledge and local knowledge .In-person interviews were conducted in the winter, between December 2019 – February 2020; three interviews were conducted in December 2020. We used a two-tiered interview process, where we scheduled an initial field visit and then returned for an in-depth, semi-structured interview. The purpose of the preliminary field visit was to help establish rapport and increase the amount and depth of knowledge farmers shared during the semi-structured interviews. Farmers were asked to walk through their farm and talk more generally about their fields, their management practices, pipp drying racks and their understanding of the term “soil health.”

The field interview also provided an opportunity for open dialogue with farmers regarding management practices and local knowledge . Because local knowledge is often tacit, the field component was beneficial to connect knowledge shared to specific fields and specific practices. After the initial field visits, all 13 farmers were contacted to participate in a follow up visit to their farm that consisted of a semi-structured interview followed by a brief survey. The semistructured interview is the most standard technique for gathering local knowledge . These in-depth interviews allowed us to ask the same questions of each farmer so that comparisons between interviews could be made. To develop interview questions for the semistructured interviews , we established initial topics such as the farmer’s background, farm history, general farm management and soil management approaches. We consulted with two organic farmers to develop final interview questions. The final format of the semi-structured interviews was designed to encourage deep knowledge sharing. For example, the interview questions were structured such that questions revisited topics to allow interviewees to expand on and deepen their answer with each subsequent version of the question. Certain questions attempted to understand farmer perspectives from multiple angles and avoided scientific jargon or frameworks whenever possible. Most questions promoted open-ended responses to elicit the full range of possible responses from farmers. In the interviews, we posed questions about the history and background of the participant and their farm operation, how participants learned to farm, and to describe this process of learning in their own words, as well as details about their general management approaches.

Farmers were encouraged to share specific stories and observations that related to specific questions. Next, we asked a detailed set of questions about their soil management practices, including specific questions about soil quality and soil fertility on their farm. In this context, soil quality focused on ecological aspects of their soil’s ability to perform key functions for their farm operation ; while soil fertility centered on agronomic aspects of their soils’ ability to sustain nutrients necessary for production agriculture . A brief in-person survey that asked a few demographic questions was administered at the end of the semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted in person on farms to ensure consistency and to help put farmers at ease. The interviews typically lasted two hours and were recorded with permission from the interviewee. Interviews were transcribed, reviewed for accuracy, and uploaded to NVivo 12, a software tool used to categorize and organize themes systematically based on research questions . Coding is a commonly used qualitative analysis technique that allows researchers to explore, understand, and compare interviews by tracking specific themes . Through structured analysis of the interview transcripts, we identified key themes and constructed a codebook to delineate categories of knowledge. Once initial coding was complete, we reviewed quotations related to each code to assess whether the code was accurate. The final analysis included both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the coded entries. For the quantitative measure, we tallied both the number of coded passages regarding different themes or topics, and the number of farmers who addressed each theme. In addition, we examined the content of the individual coded entries to understand the nature of farmer knowledge and consensus or divergence among farmer responses for each theme. The organic farmers in Yolo County that were interviewed for this study demonstrated wide and deep knowledge of their farming systems.

Results show that white, first- and second-generation farmers in alternative agriculture do accumulate substantive local knowledge of their farming systems—even within a decade or two of farming. These particular organic farmers demonstrated a complex understanding of their physical environments, soil ecosystems, and local contexts that expands and complements other knowledge bases that inform farming systems. In order to integrate the wide range of knowledge shared in the results, a theoretical framework that incorporates emergent characteristics of the process of farmer knowledge formation is helpful to consider. In the first section of the discussion, we outlined a framework for farmer knowledge formation is outlined. For the latter half of the discussion section, we elaborate on key aspects of farmer knowledge that emerged from results of this study. Figure 1 summarizes a proposed theoretical framework for farmer knowledge formation. This framework recognizes the importance of linking social and ecological processes in order to capture interactions between humans and the environment, and is therefore informed by and extends existing frameworks in the social-ecological literature and can be applied to other farming contexts . The framework encapsulates both social and ecological ways of knowing through an adaptive feedback process, wherein farmers are considered the primary actors in this process of knowledge formation. As shown in Figure 1, farmer knowledge forms through both social and ecological mechanisms. Social mechanisms refer to social and cultural phenomena that influence farmer knowledge and their personal ethos interactively; ecological mechanisms represent how farmers’ observations of and experiences with environmental conditions and ecological processes on their farms influences their knowledge and ethos . Here, farmer ethos is broadly defined as a farmer’s worldview on farming—a set of social values or belief system that a farmer aspires to institute on their farm . As highlighted in yellow, social mechanisms play a central role in producing a farmer’s ethos and in integrating ecological knowledge into their farm operation. At the same time, ecological mechanisms contribute to a farmer’s local ecological knowledge base, and importantly, place limits on the incorporation of social values in practice on farms. Together, these social and ecological mechanisms provide the filter through which farmer ethos and ecological knowledge is re-evaluated over time. As outlined in green, farmer ethos also mutually informs ecological knowledge, and vice versa, in a dynamic, dialectical process as individual farmers apply their ethos or ecological knowledge in practice on their farm. Based on results of this study, pipp horticulture social mechanisms include inherited wisdom from and informal conversations with other local farmers . Likewise, direct observation, personal experience, and on-farm experimentation—wherein a farmer applies the scientific method to make abstract science concrete—are central to developing farmers’ specific ecological knowledge . In general, farmers interviewed tended to rely less on abstract, “basic” science and more on concrete, “applied” science that is based on their specific local contexts and environment . In this way, social and ecological mechanisms were key in translating abstract information into concrete knowledge among farmers interviewed. Findings suggest that experimentation codifies direct observations to generate farmer knowledge that is both concrete and transferable. To a lesser degree, personal experience enhanced farmer knowledge and guided the process of experimentation.This framework is useful for categorizing and tracking farmer learning on working farms. As an example, farmers with a stewardship ethos viewed themselves as caretakers of their land; one farmer described their role as “a liaison between this piece of land and the human environment.” Farmers that self-identified as stewards or caretakers of their land tended to rely most heavily on direct observation and personal experience to learn about their local ecosystems and develop their local ecological knowledge. This knowledge directly informed how farmers approached management of their farms and the types of management practices and regimes they applied.

That said, farmer ethos did not always completely align with farming practices applied day-today due to both social and ecological limits of their environment. For example, one farmer, who considered himself a caretaker of his land expressed that cover crops were central to his management regime and that “we’ve underestimated how much benefit we can get from cover crops.” This same farmer admitted he had not been able to grow cover crops the last few seasons due to early rains, heavy clay in his soil, and the need to have crops ready for early summer markets. In another example, several farmers learned about variations in their soil type by directly observing how soil “behaved” using cover crop growth patterns. These farmers discussed that they learned about patchy locations in their fields, including issues with drainage, prior management history, soil type, and other field characteristics, through observation of cover crop growth in their fields. Repeated observations over space and time helped to transform disparate observations into formalized knowledge. As observations accumulated over space and time, they informed knowledge formation across scales, from specific features of farmers’ fields to larger ecological patterns and phenomena. More broadly, using cover crop growth patterns to assess soil health and productivity allowed several farmers to make key decisions that influenced the long-term resilience of their farm operation . This specific adaptive management technique was developed independently by several farmers over the course of a decade of farming through long-term observation and experimentation and, at the time, was not widely accessible in farming guidebooks, policy recommendations, or the scientific literature. For these farmers, growing a cover crop on new land or land with challenging soils is now formally part of their farm management program and central to their soil management. While some farmers considered this process “trial and error,” in actuality, all farmers engaged in a structured, iterative process of robust decision making in the face of constant uncertainty, similar to the process of adaptative management in the natural resource literature . This critical link to adaptative management is important to consider in the broader context of resilience thinking, wherein adaptive management is a tool in the face of shifting climate regimes and changing landscapes . Specifically, the framework provided in this paper is useful to understand some of the underlying social and ecological mechanisms that produce farmer knowledge, and that may in turn inform adaptive management and pathways toward more resilient agriculture . In this sense, farmer knowledge represents an untapped source for informing concrete adaptative management techniques that are initially adapted to local contexts but also have the potential to be widely applied. Farmer knowledge provides an extension to scientific and policy knowledge bases, in that farmers develop new dimensions of knowledge previously unexplored in the scientific literature. Farmers offer a key source of and process for making abstract knowledge more concrete and better grounded in practice, which is at the heart of adaptive management . Farmer knowledge accumulation, at least among organic farmers in this study, is mostly observational and experiential. Most farmers considered themselves separate from scientific knowledge production and though scientific knowledge did at times inform their own knowledge production, they still ultimately relied on their own direct observation and personal experiences to inform their knowledge base and make decisions. This finding underscores the importance of translating theory into practice in alternative agriculture. Without grounding theoretical scientific findings or policy recommendations in practice, whether that be day-to-day practices or long-term management applied, farmers cannot readily incorporate such “outsider” knowledge into their farm operations.

Tomatoes are likely a better proxy for other vegetable crops , though each will have its unique requirements . As we imagine a shift towards dry farm agriculture in California, it is also important to consider how land that is suitable for dry farming is currently being used. Combining areas that are suitable for tomato dry farming with and without irrigation, we compiled a list of the top ten crops by area that are currently grown on these lands . Some of them are currently being dry farmed with some regularity in the state and could signal particularly easy targets for a shift to low-water practices. Others are dry farmed in other Mediterranean climates and suggest an important opportunity for management exploration in lands that might be particularly forgiving to experimentation. The remaining crops are some of the most water intensive in the state and would therefore lead to substantial water savings if the land could be repurposed. While unrealistic in the near future, calculating potential water savings from a complete conversion of suitable lands to dry farming allows for comparison with other water saving strategies. Even assuming that an acre-foot of irrigation is added to each acre of dry farm crops every year , if all the land listed in Table 3 were converted to dry farming and irrigated to the statewide averages listed in the table , California would save 700 billion gallons of water per year, vertical grow system or nearly half the volume of Shasta Lake, the largest reservoir in the state.

Given the overlap between suitable dry farm areas and high priority groundwater basins, these potential water savings are especially valuable as water districts scramble to balance their water budgets in light of SGMA. Perhaps the largest caveat to these potential water savings–and any analysis of dry farm suitability that relies solely on environmental constraints–is the economic reality in which conversions to dry farming currently occur. As discussed above, while a dramatic reduction in irrigation inputs might be feasible from a crop physiological perspective, whether farms can remain profitable through such a transition is an entirely different question. Given a dramatically increased supply of dry farm tomatoes, the profits that current dry farmers rely on could easily crumble. When considering other, less charismatic crops that could be good candidates for dry farming , customers’ likely hesitance to pay as steep a premium for high quality produce as they do for tomatoes also casts doubt on the viability of a large-scale dry farm transition given current profit structures for farmers.Our suitability map shows potential for vegetable dry farming to be practiced on California croplands that are currently irrigated, though its expansion is inherently limited. Even if markets could be adapted to support an influx of dry farmed vegetables, our map indicates that climatic constraints will largely require dry farming to be practiced in coastal regions or other microclimates that can provide cool temperatures and sufficient rainfall. However, the Central Coast’s tomato dry farming offers principles–but not a blueprint–for low water agriculture in other regions.

Based on themes from our interviews, these principles show a cycle of water savings that connect reduced inputs, management diversification, and market development . The cycle begins with lower irrigation , which can be accomplished in concert with soil health practices that build soil water holding capacity and increase long-term fertility. Reduced weed pressure and lower biomass production can then lead to reducing other inputs, such as labor and fertilizers, while also allowing for further water savings. The combination of reduced inputs and soil health practices then gives rise to a product that is unique in its water saving potential, and may also be of unusually high quality. By encouraging consumers to appreciate the products, or through novel policy support, farmers can develop markets that will provide a premium for these low-water products–or payment for the practice itself–which in turn creates an opportunity to expand the practice, further lowering inputs.As we ask how policies may impact dry farm production systems, we find a forking path in what types of expansion may result from different policies. An increase in production can be accomplished through both scaling size and scaling number . Both options can tap into the water saving cycle to decrease water usage; however, the search for just, agroecological transitions has pointed time and again to the need for scaling number . On the Central Coast, small, diversified farms have used this water saving cycle to both cut water use and develop a specialty product that allows growers to farm in areas with high land values by increasing their land access, profits, and resilience to local water shortages. Through these principles, small-scale operations have differentiated their management from both industrial farms and even other small farms in the region by creating a system based in localized knowledge, soil health practices, and thought-intensive management.

However, it cannot be taken as a given that this water saving cycle will continue to uplift the small scale operations on which it started. Recent work highlights the potential for biophysical and sociopolitical conditions to combine to shrink–rather than grow–the use and viability of agroecological systems . In the case of dry farm tomatoes, socio-political attention is already beginning to target the biophysical need to decrease water consumption. If well-intentioned policy interventions designed to decrease irrigation water use build markets that value the fact of dry farming, rather than the high quality fruits it produces , growers will be able to scale the size of dry farm operations without needing to rely on the highly localized knowledge required to produce high quality fruits. As large grocers scale up dry farm produce sales without worrying about quality-based markets that may quickly saturate at industrial scales, the agroecological systems that originally produced dry farm tomatoes may be edged out of the market. On the other hand, if policies build guaranteed markets for small farms growing dry farm produce, dry farming may grow by scaling out to more small-scale operations. Policies focused on water savings may then favor industrial or small-scale farms, depending on how interventions shape the “Market Development” aspect of the cycle. We therefore examine this cycle not only as a means to save water, but ask if and how it can enhance the viability of nonindustrial farming operations as the food system adapts to restricted water availability. We consider the relevant policy recommendations outlined in Blesh et al.’s analysis of how institutional pathways can act synergistically with farmer networks to enable agricultural diversification , asking which have the potential to point future dry farming towards scaling size vs scope.To better situate these policy options in the local context, we first look to the outcomes of institutional intervention in organic strawberry production in a very similar region on the Central Coast, and consider the analogous options for dry farm tomatoes. Similar to dry farm tomatoes, organic strawberry production was launched into the spotlight by government-mandated input curtailments . For strawberries, the development of an organic strawberry production system also coincided with the adoption of an organic certification process by the US Department of Agriculture. Growing public interest in organic strawberries and the methyl bromide ban led to the rapid expansion of industrial-scale organic strawberry production– blatantly scaling size of production . As production increased, organic strawberry markets saturated and prices crashed, pipp racking leaving an economic landscape where only the largest operations could remain viable selling strawberries at market prices . At this point, agroecological growers had to redouble their efforts to target local consumers with direct marketing strategies, as the organic label no longer added the necessary value to profitably sell their product.In an analogous case for dry farm tomatoes, it is easy to see the immediate appeal of establishing a “dry farm” label that can incorporate the social value added to dry farm tomatoes into the price of the product without relying on consumers trusting and paying a premium based solely on higher qualities. However, by divorcing dry farm practices from quality premiums and trusting relationships with customers, a dry farm label would make it much easier for large-scale growers to enter the dry farm market. These larger operations–which may struggle to produce high quality fruits or maintain direct relationships with customers but can still decrease water usage enough to produce a certified dry farm tomato–could easily grow dry farm produce at large enough scales to edge smaller growers out of the label. As has been seen in the organic program, industrial growers could also lobby for an official relaxation–a literal watering down–of label standards . This sidestep of the dry farm practices described in the above interviews would not only further advantage large scale farmers, but would also undermine the very water savings that they are meant to encourage. Administrative costs involved in enrolling in payment-for-practice programs can be a cumbersome barrier to entry, while low payouts at small scales dissuade small farmers who implement the practice from enrolling .

These patterns are currently seen in programs offering cost shares for cover cropping, where farm size is significantly larger for participants than non-participants .Given farmers’ interest and current experimentation with dry farming non-tomato vegetables, expanding the set of crops that can be dry farmed and adapted to local conditions is a clear target for future policies. Support for research and participatory breeding programs/variety evaluation could spur development of locally-adapted dry farm varietals. By compensating farmers for experimentation with diversified dry farm rotations and development of locally adapted varietals, policymakers can also absorb some of the risk inherent to on-farm experimentation and encourage innovation on the farms that are most familiar with the practice, while simultaneously lowering barriers for farmers new to the practice. To create a policy environment where experimentation feels more accessible to farmers, minimum lease terms could be set for farmland, allowing farmers to feel more secure in investing in localized practices . Priority could also be given to creating programs that connect farmers–particularly new farmers and those who hold underrepresented identities–to available farmland. Without the burden of securing water access, lands that would otherwise be impossible to farm with summer crops could become arable, particularly in conjunction with the concurrent support of the other policies discussed here. Though many areas will still require some access to water to successfully dry farm , crops’ need for water coincides with points in the season when surface water is most available , making areas with inconsistent water access over the course of the season likely candidates for dry farm success. Priority might initially be given to areas shown as suitable on the map, but as new and locally adapted crop varieties emerge, access may also extend.As water shortages are exacerbated by changing climates in California and across the globe, there is an increasingly urgent need to adapt agricultural systems to use less water. By nearly or entirely cutting irrigation to tomato crops grown in the summer season, dry farming has particular appeal as a low-water alternative to irrigation-intensive agricultural systems. While tomato dry farming is an inherently localized farming practice, suitable only for implementation in a specific region, it also offers a global model for how farming systems might shift towards low-water agriculture. Beyond decreasing water use, with the right policy support, dry farming also presents an opportunity to support innovation on small, diversified farms, transitioning the food system towards an agroecological future.Joya de Cerén offers a unique and exciting opportunity to study the daily lives of Mesoamerican rural residents and their household contexts during the Late Classic period in what is now El Salvador. The village was rapidly abandoned and experienced a sudden burial below several meters of fine volcanic ash and coarse cinders deposited from the eruption of Loma Caldera circa 592–660 CE . This eruption was relatively small in that its ash deposits only covered a few square kilometers . The ancient village of Cerén was unlucky enough to be located only 600 m southeast of Loma Caldera, falling victim to several hours of tephra falls and lava bombs that buried the settlement. Along with the rapid burial from tephra deposits, thatch roofs of the domestic structures caught on fire, subsequently preserving much of the village even further. The conditions that resulted from this eruption led to exceptional archaeological preservation and allows for the recovery of earthen architecture as well as materials left in situ that related to daily activities such as intact ceramic vessels, finely crafted lithic tools, and organic material that was utilized in a wide range of ways.

Changing climates have caused droughts that not only result in massive financial losses , but also raise major concerns for farmers’ ability to maintain continuity in their farming operations. Because California’s waters are over-allocated even in years of typical rainfall, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which requires sustainable groundwater use by 2040, implies that irrigation will need to be discontinued on hundreds of thousands of cropland acres. In this backdrop, dry farming, a practice in which farmers grow crops with little to no irrigation, has quickly garnered interest from farmers and policy-makers around the state. While dry farming is an ancient practice with rich histories in many regions, perhaps most notably the Hopi people in Northeast Arizona, dry farming emerged more recently in California, with growers first marketing dry farm tomatoes as such in the Central Coast region in the early 1980’s. In a lineage that likely traces back to Italian and Spanish growers, dry farming on the Central Coast relies on winter rains to store water in soils that plants can then access throughout California’s rain-free summers, allowing farmers to grow produce with little to no external water inputs. As water-awareness gains public attention, dry farming has been increasingly mentioned as an important piece in California’s water resiliency puzzle, however, while some extension articles exist no peer-reviewed research has been published to date on vegetable dry farming in California. We therefore assembled a group of six dry farming operations on the Central Coast to collaboratively identify and answer key management questions in the dry farm community. Growers identified three main management questions that would benefit from further research: 1. Which depths of nutrients are most influential in determining fruit yield and quality? 2. Are AMF inoculants effective in this low-water system, and more broadly. 3. How can farmers best support high-functioning soil fungal communities to improve harvest outcomes?

Growers were primarily concerned with fruit yield and quality, vertical grow rack system with blossom end rot prevention and overall fruit quality being of particular interest due to the water stress and high market value inherent to this system. Managing for yields and quality present a unique challenge in dry farm systems, as the surface soils that farmers typically target for fertility management in irrigated systems dry down quickly to a point where roots will likely have difficulty accessing nutrients and water. Because plants are likely to invest heavily in deeper roots as compared to irrigated crops, we hypothesized that nutrients deeper in the soil profile would be more instrumental in determining fruit yields and quality. As deficit irrigation and drought change microbial community composition in other agricultural and natural systems, we hypothesized that dry farm management would cause shifts in fungal communities in response to dry farm management, which could in turn improve tomato harvest outcomes. Beyond general shifts in fungal communities, farmers were specifically interested in arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi inoculants, which are increasingly available from commercial sellers. Recent research has shown that AMF can help plants tolerate water stress, and we therefore hypothesized that commercial AMF inoculants might be beneficial. We organized a season-long field experiment from early spring to late fall of 2021 to answer these questions, sampling soils and collecting harvest data from plots on seven dry farm tomato fields on the Central Coast. Each farmer managed the fields exactly as they normally would, with AMF inoculation being the only experimental manipulation. We sampled soils for nutrients and water content at four depths down to one meter throughout the growing season to determine which nutrient depths influenced harvest outcomes. We also took DNA samples from soils and roots in surface and subsurface dry farm soils, as well as nearby irrigated and non-cultivated soils, sequencing the ITS2 region to analyze the fungal community to verify inoculation establishment and more broadly characterize soil fungal communities to see how fungal communities changed under dry farm management and determine whether these changes or the introduction of an inoculant influenced harvest outcomes.

We then used Bayesian generalized linear mixed models to estimate the effects of nutrient depths and fungal community metrics on yield and fruit quality data from 10-20 weekly harvests on each field. Our results highlight a tension between managing nutrients for fruit yield and quality, while fungal community metrics show promise for increasing fruit quality. The experiment was conducted on seven certified organic dry farm tomato fields in Santa Cruz and San Mateo counties in California during the 2021 growing season. Five blocks were established on each field over the course of a full growing season , for a total of 70 experimental plots. These fields are managed by six farms; one farm contributed two fields at two separate sites. Each farmer continued to manage their field for the duration of the experiment according to their typical practices. Each dry farm crop was preceded by a crop in the winter prior to the experiment, either in the form of a cover crop , or continuous winter production . All fields were disked prior to planting, and two fields additionally ripped down to 60-90cm. Each field’s plant and bed spacing, plant date, and tomato variety are listed in Table 1, along with amendments added to the soil. Fields also varied in their rotational history . The mapped soil series, measured texture, and soil pH are listed in Table 3. From March 2 to October 27 there were 15 rain events greater than 1 mm recorded at the De Laveaga CIMIS weather station , none of which occurred between the months of May and October . Monthly weather data is summarized in Table 4.A nested experimental design was used to account for management and biophysical differences across fields. Each plot contained 12 plants, and plots were divided across two beds with a buffer row between . Plots were randomly selected to be inoculated in the first experimental row and then paired with a counterpart in the second experimental row that received the opposite inoculation condition to achieve a randomized complete block design with five blocks per field. Here we refer to a pair of inoculated and control plots as a block. There were three non-inoculated buffer plants between each plot and at least twenty buffer plants at the start and end of each experimental row. Harvests began when farmers indicated that they were beginning to harvest the portion of their field that included the experimental plots. Each field was harvested once per week from its start date to its end date, grow rack with lights with the exception of Farm 5, which was harvested twice per week, in accordance with farmer desires. All red tomatoes were harvested from each plot and sorted into marketable, blossom end rot, sunburnt, or “other unmarketable” fruits and then weighed. Harvests stopped when there were no remaining tomatoes in the field or when farmers decided to terminate the field. Fruit size and quality were assessed on the third, sixth, and ninth week of harvest at a given field. Ten representative marketable tomatoes were taken from each plot, weighed, dried at 70 degrees C and then weighed again to establish the percent dry weight . PDW was used as a proxy for fruit quality, with fruits with a lower water content increasing fruit quality up to a certain point.

Extension research has linked dry farm fruit quality with lower fruit water content, as opposed to specific compounds that are elevated in dry farm tomatoes, and we expect PDW to correlate highly with the concentration of flavors previously found to create dry farm fruits’ superior quality. After eliciting quality categorization from farmers in the study, we determined that fruit quality increases up to a PDW of 8%, peaks between 8 and 12%, and falls above 12%.Soil samples were taken three times over the course of the field season: once at transplant , once mid-season , and once during harvest . Each sample was then divided into fresh soil , dried at 60 degrees C , and dried at 105 degrees C . Ammonium and nitrate levels were measured after using 2M KCl to extract samples from transplant , midseason , and harvest samples using colorimetry. As soil pH was close to neutral, Olsen P37 was used to measure plant-available phosphate on samples from transplant and midseason . Gravimetric water content was assessed for all samples. Samples from transplant were composited by depth at each field, and texture was assessed using a modified pipette method38. At transplant, a soil core was taken with a bucket auger down to one meter from a central plot in each field and used to calculate bulk density at each depth increment. We then took a weighted average of GWC at each plot to calculate available water using bulk density and a pedotransfer function based on soil texture. Potentially leachable soil nitrate levels were calculated for each field using nitrate concentrations from the top 15cm at the harvest sampling event, which occurred within the first three weeks of harvest. Though the plants continued to grow for the duration of the harvest, it is unlikely that nitrate from the top 15cm were used due to the soil’s low water content, and no precipitation orirrigation occurred for the duration of harvest. Bulk density in the top 15cm was assumed to be 1.2 g soil/cm3 as experimental bulk density was measured with 1m of soil and likely overestimated the bulk density at the surface of the soil.Soil sub-samples taken from 0-15cm and 30-60cm at midseason were set aside for DNA analysis. In addition to the experimental plots, samples were also taken from both depths at the nearest irrigated crop production areas and non-cultivated soils, such as hedgerows, field sides, etc. . Gloves were worn while taking these samples and the auger was cleaned thoroughly with a wire brush between each sample. Roots were also collected from one plant per plot and were dug out using a trowel from the top 15 cm of soil. These samples were stored on-site in an ice-filled cooler and transferred to a -80 degree C freezer immediately upon returning to the lab . Roots were later washed in PBS Buffer/Tween20 and ground using liquid N.The ITS2 rRNA region was selected for amplification and fungal community analysis. This region has been successfully utilized in recent AMF community studies. Though AMF-specific primers exist , we chose the more general ITS2 fungal primers for several key reasons. First, in the field, SSU primers detect more taxa in nonGlomeraceae families but give lower resolution in the Glomeraceae family. Because the four species in our inoculant are in the Glomeraceae family and this family is dominant in agricultural systems and clay soils, we prioritized species resolution in Glomeraceae over other families. More broadly, the higher variability in the ITS2 region can lead to more unassigned taxa, but does not run as much of a risk that distinct taxa will be lumped together. Third, and of particular importance in our root samples, these primers are better able to select for fungal over plant material than other ITS primer options. Finally, ITS2 allowed us to also examine the broader fungal community in our samples, whereas SSU and LSU options are AMF specific and cannot be used to characterize other fungi.We modeled all yield and fruit quality data with Bayesian generalized mixed effect models. Due to zero-inflated data, we used hurdle models for yields and blossom end rot , while percent dry weight was always non-zero and therefore did not require a hurdle. To pick a model family, we modeled the non-zero data from each outcome variable with gaussian, lognormal, and gamma families, using Bayesian leave-one out estimates of the expected log pointwise predictive densities to compare model fits. Gamma models showed the best fit for each outcome variable and were therefore used for all linear models.In addition to the variables of interest, each model had a random effect of field and block within field. Yields were modeled using the total marketable fruit weight harvested from each plot at each harvest point, while BER was modeled using the proportion of fruits that were classified as non-marketable due to BER from each plot at each harvest point.