From February to September 2021, we collected data on lobbying expenditures originating from the cannabis industry and its affiliates, from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2021 . The Colorado Department of State dataset details payments to registered lobbyists, with information on funders who hire lobbyists , bill/rule titles and positions associated with payments, and lobbyist identifying information . To identify cannabis industry affiliates, we reviewed all funders in this dataset that lobbied on a list of 453 bills in fiscal years 2010–2021 that included the words “cannabis,” “marijuana,” or “hemp”. Using the CDOS business database, the Colorado Marijuana Enforcement Division search tool, and internet searches, we coded funders as cannabis affiliates if they a) held a cannabis business license, b) shared board members, owners, or investors with a cannabis company, c) disclosed members that were cannabis businesses, or d) would directly profit from cannabis sector growth . For each lobbyist employed by a cannabis affiliate we examined their other funders and identified additional cannabis affiliates using the same inclusion criteria. Because the CDOS dataset does not include lobbying payments made without a connection to a specific bill, administrative rule, or issue, we expanded the dataset by manually appending payments from cannabis affiliates in months where no lobbying was conducted for a specific bill/rule. Including these “retainer” payments allowed more accurate assessment of lobbying expenditures, because some funders make monthly payments to paymentslobbyists rather than hiring them on an ad hoc basis. Funders also make payments to lobbyists before and after legislative sessions for work during the session. The completed search yielded a list of 1703 monthly payments from 89 cannabis grow supply store affiliates with linked information on lobbyists they employed, positions on bills, and addresses. Each lobbying report available on the CDOS website included an “industry type” field where lobbyists provide a description of the funder’s business. We coded these disclosures as “transparent” if the name or description contained a reference to cannabis, marijuana, or hemp and “ambiguous” if it did not. Cannabis industry affiliates could be represented by lobbying agencies, lobbyists, and subcontractors.
Cannabis affiliates may pay individual lobbyists or pay lobbying agencies that funnel those payments to salaried lobbyists or subcontractors. Lobbying agencies sometimes list themselves as funders even though this practice was made illegal by the Lobbyist Transparency Act Lobbyist Transparency Act, 2019. We excluded reported self-funding because it was impossible to identify the underlying funder. To prevent double counting, we only included direct payments from cannabis affiliates and excluded payments to subcontractors and employees salaried by lobbying agencies. We reviewed cannabis lobbying expenditures in Colorado over time using Stata 16 and then qualitatively reviewed lobbying positions on proposed legislation. Our analyses assessed total cannabis lobbying expenditures and the share drawn from national sources, the extent to which expenditures were clearly identified as associated with cannabis, and alliances with other industries. We conclude with a case study of cannabis industry efforts to create cannabis consumption establishments. We selected this issue because legislation on the topic was introduced multiple times over the course of three years and under two gubernatorial administrations, allowing insight into changes in lobbying practices over time. We collected data from audio recordings of legislative testimony and floor debate, legislative histories, fiscal notes, and lobbying reports for all legislation dealing with cannabis consumption establishments available through the Colorado General Assembly and Secretary of State websites. We present a narrative description of each bill’s legislative history, including information from lobbying reports and demonstrative quotations made in public testimony that indicate cannabis industry influence in the policy making process. Many cannabis affiliates that appeared independent shared professional or personal ties. In 2019, 14 different funders lobbied in support of HB1090, a bill that allowed publicly traded corporations to own or invest in cannabis businesses and removed residency requirements.
These 14 funders were exclusively cannabis affiliates or lobbying agencies with known cannabis industry connections: LivWell, Buddy Boy, Dixie Brands, Gobi Labs, Gold Dome Access, Lightshade, Medicine Man, MedPharm Holdings, Native Roots, Natural Selections, TEQ Analytic Solutions, The Green Solution, Vicente Sederberg, and Wolf Public Affairs. All but Gobi Labs shared professional ties: John Fritzel was an owner of both Lightshade and Buddy Boy, and Andy Williams was the president of both Medicine Man and MedPharm Holdings . Representatives from Lightshade, LivWell, Native Roots, Vicente Sederberg, Medicine Man, MedPharm Buddy Boy, Dixie Brands, and Columbia Care were board members or donors for the Cannabis Trade Federation. Leadership from Medicine Man, MedPharm Holdings, Native Roots, Dixie Brands, TEQ Analytical Solutions, Vicente Sederberg and the chairman of the Marijuana Industry Group all sat on the Board of Directors for Colorado Leads, an alliance of cannabis businesses. Cannabis industry affiliates with an out-of-state address spent $802,983 between fiscal years 2010–2021 . Given that some cannabis businesses are multi-state operations with locations in Colorado and others use in-state PO boxes, this proportion is likely an underestimate. Immediately following adult-use legalization in November 2012 and prior to the creation of the recreational sales market in January 2014, the Washington D.C. based nonprofit Marijuana Policy Project dramatically increased its expenditures in Colorado. The proportion of out-of-state lobbying expenditures increased from 5.5% of lobbying expenditures in fiscal years 2010–2015 to 12.6% in fiscal years 2016–2021 . California-based cannabis organizations lobbying in Colorado increased from one business spending $14,492 in 2017 to five spending $153,220 in 2020. One cannabis affiliated organization each from Ontario , New York , and Oregon lobbied in Colorado, as well as two from Washington D.C. .The bill survived less than three months before indefinite postponement by the Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology in March 2017. On the same day, SB184, which would allow local governments to permit private membership cannabis clubs and clarify the constitutional definition of consumption that is conducted “openly and publicly” was heard in the same committee.
Kevin Bommer of the Colorado Municipal League testified that the CML brought the bill to the legislative sponsors after it was initiated by the city of Trinidad. Renaissance Solutions, the Drug Policy Alliance, Terrapin Care Station, Denver relief Consulting, Schultz Public Affairs, and Pueblo County supported the bill while health groups including ACS CAN and the American Heart Association, hospital systems, and other local governments opposed. The House and Senate could not agree on amendments and the bill died in May. Onsite cannabis consumption establishments were considered again in the 2018 session through HB1258. This bill proposed “Marijuana Accessory Consumption Establishments” for existing licensees and was supported by Dixie Brands, LivWell, Good Chemistry, Renaissance Solutions, Medicine Man, Native Roots, Gold Dome Access, and the Colorado Hotel and Lodging Association. It was opposed by ACS CAN, local governments, consultants, Colorado Association of Police Chiefs, and Colorado Christian University due to indoor air quality concerns related to indoor use of electronic smoking devices, which were excluded from the definition of “smoking” at the time. However, the Southern Colorado Cannabis Council and My420 tours opposed the bill because it could eliminate party bus cannabis tours and did not create true social consumption establishments. After passing the House and Senate, the bill was vetoed by Governor Hickenlooper amid concerns that it violated the Colorado Constitutional prohibition on “consumption that is conducted openly and publicly” . A parallel bill, SB211, was introduced in March 2018 by Senator Marble and would have allowed smoking in “consumption clubs” through an exemption to the Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act. The bill was again supported by Renaissance Solutions, Inc. and opposed by the City of Colorado Springs, Denver Health, Healthier Colorado, the American Heart Association, Smart Strategies, the Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police, ACS CAN, and the Colorado Association of Local Public Health Officials. It died in the Senate Committee on Business Labor and Technology in April. Our findings suggest that after recreational legalization the cannabis industry expanded its lobbying activities and used tactics comparable to those used by similar industries seeking to promote consumption. The dramatic increase in cannabis industry lobbying expenditures over time mirrored growth of the cannabis industry following recreational legalization in November 2012, which also coincided with an increase in cannabis consumption. Funding originating from out-of-state sources also increased over time, suggesting the development of a national network of cannabis drainage system affiliates with similar interests. Legislators, public health advocates, and community organizers should therefore expect industry resistance to cannabis control measures from local and national sources as well as proactive industry efforts to promote consumption and profits through policy making channels.Colorado lobbyists characterized their clients ambiguously almost half of the time, meaning that cannabis affiliates could only be identified through lengthy investigation. These characterizations resulted in the appearance that many funders supported some proposed legislation, which may have created a false impression of a broad coalition. In reality these interests shared common owners, represented the same professional associations, and used the same lobbyists.
We also found some evidence suggesting that public relations agencies may have hidden cannabis industry funding by paying salaried lobbyists on the behalf of funders without identifying them. To improve transparency, the Colorado Sunshine Law could be strengthened by a requirement in C.R.S. 24–6–301 §1.9 that lobbyists disclose their client’s identity as a cannabis business or any cannabis affiliation they hold under the “industry type” field . To accomplish this, a revision of section 1 of the same statute may also be needed to eliminate the provision protecting clients from disclosure of “the names of any of its shareholders, investors, business partners, coalition partners, members, donors, or supporters, as applicable.” These changes would easily allow researchers and members of the public to identify cannabis clients as such using the CDOS website and facilitate improved legislative accountability. Cannabis affiliates used lobbyists focused solely on cannabis as well as sharing lobbyists with other industries including tobacco, alcohol, pharmaceutical, and gaming. Like other industries, the cannabis industry is likely to work with these business interests to further their own profits. Using the same tactics employed by these industries, cannabis industry representatives self-reported lobbying positions opposing clean indoor air laws, health warnings for pregnant women, and potency restrictions, while supporting investment, onsite consumption, and access to medical cannabis in schools. Cannabis industry funding peaked in 2019, which may be related to the change in state governor: Governor Hickenlooper was moderate on cannabis, vetoing several pro-cannabis bills, while successor Governor Polis had voiced support for the cannabis industry and was publicly supported by cannabis affiliates. The industry may have viewed his first year in office as an opportunity to pass pro-cannabis industry bills, including cannabis hospitality businesses, that had failed in previous years . In light of the sophisticated and well-financed influence campaign conducted by the cannabis industry, policymakers should push for stricter separation between the industry and the policy making process. Frameworks designed to prevent undue influence from other commercial determinants of health including the alcohol, food, and tobacco industries can dampen industry influence by creating firewalls between corporations and policymakers.
Example policies, including the guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control , the World Health Organization’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors , and the Office of Economic Co-operation and Development’s recommendations for preventing policy capture , could serve as starting points. These frameworks stand in opposition to the system of private interest institutionalism in Colorado which encourages the inclusion of all stakeholders and prompts regulators to make policies that synthesize stakeholder input. If formal mechanisms preventing cannabis industry influence in policy are not established, legislators should at least guarantee an equal voice to health advocates through balanced and accessible stake holding processes. Our research has limitations. For public relations and law firms who represented multiple interests, expenditures that were not explicitly delineated as being from cannabis companies were not included in our analysis as the origin of funds could not be identified. For this reason, lobbying expenditures are likely undercounted. Second, the exactpositions or intentions of cannabis industry affiliates on proposed bills could not necessarily be determined from the lobbying record; instead, where possible, we relied on legislative testimony. Next, the exclusion of salaries from lobbying agencies with ties to the cannabis industry to their employees may lead to an underestimation of the total influence exerted by cannabis interests. Finally, our description of lobbying expenditures did not include pro-bono industry lobbying activities conducted on behalf of cannabis affiliates.