In its final form, substitute HB 235 was essentially a signage law, requiring the proprietor or manager of a public place to post a sign at all public entrances stating whether or not there were areas within the establishment reserved for non-smokers. Substitute HB 235 also segregated smoking areas in public health care facilities, but contained no penalty provisions. Most significantly, substitute HB 235 allowed for an entire establishment to be declared a smoking area.A Tobacco Institute Legislative Bulletin dated March 16, 1979 from Washington D.C. discussed the passage of HB 235, and described it as an “already weakened substitute,” and that lobbying against it “was like lobbying against courtesy,” since it contained no penalties and no enforcement procedure.Courtesy, or the notion that individual discretion would be enough to keep smokers from exposing others to second-hand smoke, was an alternative to legislation often given by the tobacco industry and its allies. The Legislative Bulletin further shows that the industry was attempting to attack the bill through more direct contact with government officials, though believed it’s chances were slim: “We are meeting with Governor Thomas L. Judge to explore the possibility of a veto, but this action appears remote at this time.” Despite the beginnings of a larger tobacco control movement occurring nationwide, the tobacco industry had little to be concerned about with regards to the Montana Clean Indoor Act. There would be little change to the act in the subsequent decades, with the exception of HB 794, also sponsored Rep. Ellerd, which amended the Montana Clean Indoor Act in 1981 to provide for a criminal penalty of $25.At the HB 794 hearing before the House Human Service Committee on Feb. 20, 1981, State Department of Health and Environmental Services representatives explained that many owners of public establishments had refused to post signs,ebb and flow flood table causing enforcement problems which the DHES believed solvable by the proposed bill.
Other proponents testifying at the February hearing were representatives from of the Montana Lung Association and the Montana Medical Association. Of the three people testifying in opposition to HB 794 at the House Committee hearing, two were representing the Montana Tavern Association: Lobbyist Don W. Larson and Bob Durkee, both of whom would again testify against the bill at the subsequent Senate Public Health Committee meeting, where it would be heard after HB 794 passed in the House in a 53 to 41 vote on February 25, 1981.At the March 18, 1981 Senate Public Health Committee hearing on HB 794, supporting testimony again came from the DHES, as well as the Lewis and Clark County Health Department and the Montana Medical Association.Testimony in opposition to the bill was heard from the two representatives of the Montana Tavern Association who spoke at the House Committee hearing , as well as from Tom Maddox, executive director of the MATCD and a Tobacco Institute lobbyist.Maddox stated that his organization opposed the bill because there was already substantial compliance with the law throughout the state, and that HB 794 would trigger thousands of dollars in litigation. However, the Senate showed agreement with the recommendation from the Department of Health, and voted in favor of HB 794 on March 31, 1981. It was then signed by the Governor on April 15, 1981.In 1983, Gov. Ted Schwinder proposed House Bill 511, introduced and sponsored in the House by Rep. Francis Bardanouve on January 26, 1983, to increase the cigarette tax from 12 cents to 15 cents a pack,“in order to finance long-range building bonds.”HB 511 would raise approximately $4 million per year.The main motivation behind the proposed bill was the need to raise funding for long-range government building programs, as opposed to a desire to curb the state’s smoking rate. Indeed, no health organizations, health advocates, or public health officials testified at the House Taxation Committee hearing on March 3, 1983 regarding HB 511.
Proponents of the bill who did testify were representatives of the Office of Budget and Programing, Women Involved in Farm Economics, the Montana Pilots Association, the Associated Students of Montana State University, the Associated Students of the University of Montana, and the Montana Arts Advocacy organization. Each of these groups would be benefitted from building programs that were to be funded by the HB 511 cigarette tax.In contrast to the absence of health advocates and lack of public health arguments in the HB 511 debate, the tobacco industry and its allies had a strong presence in both the House committee hearings and in the public arena. The tobacco industry again used its strategy of encouraging supporters to contact legislators in order to spread its message and create the impression that it had wide public support,this time utilizing the Tobacco Action Network . As explained in a Philip Morris 1978 manual for employee participation in TAN, “TAN is an umbrella organization formed by the member companies of the Tobacco Institute . Its purpose is to bring together and coordinate all segments of the tobacco family – growers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and vendors – as well as our allies.”In the second edition of the TAN manual, Philip Morris explained that the purpose of TAN was to “oppose the enactment of restrictive laws and the imposition of punitive taxation.”At the March 3, 1983 House Taxation Committee hearing, testimony in opposition to HB 511 came from tavern and liquor sales associations .Among the opponents were the Silver Bow Tavern Association, three individuals representing the Montana Tavern Association , and Jerome Anderson, the registered lobbyist for the Tobacco Institute who had been a member of the State House of Representatives , and the 1961 Majority Floor Leader in the House.Anderson passed out a prepared document stating four main reasons for opposing the increased cigarette tax: it would interrupt the growth trend of cigarette sales and, thus, decrease a revenue source; it would increase the regressive tax burden on smokers, especially the poor; it would further penalize smokers who pay a disproportionate share of tax; and the livelihood of retailers and wholesalers would be hurt.Despite the lack of any health proponents at the hearing, the tobacco industry failed to stop the passage of HB 511 in the house, which benefitted from strong support from a Democratic governor leading a Democratic majority in the House, with many legislators believing that the cigarette tax would bring much needed revenue in a time of deficit.
On March 22, 1983, HB 511 passed the House by a 60-37 vote, and was referred to the Senate Taxation Committee. At the hearing before the Senate Taxation Committee on March 23, 1983, the Tobacco Institute again testified against HB 511, represented by two of its registered lobbyists, Jerome Anderson and Otis Tucker.A prepared document was again distributed at the hearing, reiterating many of the same arguments made by TI in the House Committee hearing, with the additional argument that alternative methods to fund the Long Range Building Program existed,rolling grow trays thus making the increased cigarette tax unnecessary.Among the other organizations testifying in opposition at the senate hearing were the Montana Candy and Tobacco Distributors Association and the Montana Taxpayers Association. As was the case in the House Committee hearing, no health groups or advocates testified at the Senate Hearing for HB 511. Testimony in support of the bill came from groups that wanted funding for the state’s long-range building program which would come from the increased cigarette tax, such as the Montana Arts Advocacy organization, and the Office of Budget and Program Planning.Even without the support of any health minded proponents, HB 511, raising the cigarette tax from 12 cents to 16 cents, passed on April 13, 1983 in the Senate by a 42-6 vote, and was then signed by the Governor, becoming effective on July 1, 1983.Nationally, the grass roots clean indoor air movement was well underway in the late 1980s, and several events had occurred to push the tobacco control issue forward. By 1986, more than 75 ordinances had been enacted in California,and in that same year Raymond Pritchard, chairman of the Board of Brown and Williamson Tobacco, said in the US Tobacco and Candy Journal, July 17, 1986: “Our record in defeating state smoking restrictions has been reasonably good. Unfortunately, our record with respect to local measures… have been somewhat less encouraging.” It was also in 1986 that the 19th U.S. Surgeon’s General Report, “The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking,” concluded that “[i]nvoluntary smoking is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, in healthy nonsmokers,” and warned that, “[o]n the basis of the evidence presented in this Report, it is clear that actions to protect nonsmokers from ETS [environmental tobacco smoke] exposure not only are warranted but are essential to public health.” As described by Roger Monzingo, director of state activities at the Tobacco Institute, in a December 19, 1986 “State Activities’ ETS plan of Action” memorandum to Samuel Chilcote Jr., President of the Tobacco Institute, this report was a “watershed event” for the industry, and the negative press coverage of the secondhand smoke issue was so serious that unless the Institute acted, “there will be no ‘long run’” for the tobacco industry.
In Montana, tobacco industry strategy for the state during the late 1980s was revealed in the “Guideline for Northwest Regional Grass Roots Program,” dated July 10, 1986. The Guideline reveals that one of the tobacco industry’s primary goals in the region was to organize a concerted effort between “local tobacco company executives, legislative counsel, distributors, and the Tobacco Institute” to oppose any possible tobacco control legislation.The tobacco industry intended to accomplish this by showing the “national and regional chains” and “local retailer outlets” the “correlation between adverse legislation and public perception, as a result of that legislation,” making the point that it “must be shown as a negative impact on the profits as it relates to the companies, the distributors, the sales force. They must be shown that legislation impacts their ability to maintain the level of income they need – that legislation and sales go hand in hand.” The tobacco industry wanted to create an alliance which could be used as a mechanism through which the Tobacco Institute could oppose any tobacco control legislation. Despite very little activity from health organization and advocates in Montana during the 1980s, the tobacco industry in 1986 was planning sophisticated strategies “[i]n preparation” and “in anticipation” of anti-tobacco legislation by “bringing everyone concerned to a united front,” and by setting up a mechanism that could be triggered by “an action alert sent by TI,” or, “if a crisis arises unexpectedly,” could be put into motion by TI contacting “key individuals by phone…”The tobacco industry’s forward-looking strategies were likely motivated by the national tobacco control movement that was continuing to make progress in the late 1980s. A June 15, 1987 “Special Report” by the state activities division of the Tobacco Institute commented that “[n]ot since 1975 – the year after the first significant Surgeon General’s report attacking smoking – have so many states passed smoking restriction measures. In the wake of the 1986 Surgeon General’s report, 15 states have enacted new restrictions thus far in 1987.”As late as 1987, the tobacco industry still did not consider health advocacy groups in Montana a serious threat. A “1987 State of the States” report written by the State Activities Division of the Tobacco Institute “assessing the economic and political climate of each of the 50 states as they affect the tobacco industry, and evaluating industry resources for action on legislation projected for 1987,”was written for the apparent purpose of assisting the tobacco industry and its allies in preparing legislative lobbying activities. The report observed: “Montana does not have the traditional anti-tobacco forces at work in the legislature, at least not on the surface. Most anti-tobacco legislation in past years has come from one or two specific legislators with a particular interest in tobacco restriction efforts.”Though the report does say that at least one health group and some advocates had made occasional, if unorganized, appearances regarding tobacco legislation: “On occasion, the local Helena Lung Association does make its presence known to the legislature, and similar groups in Great Falls and Billings have contacted their local legislators.”