One agriculturalist reported receiving death threats after selling water to cannabis cultivators

Posted on September 12, 2023 by hemp2022

The November 2016 state legalization of recreational cannabis prompted Siskiyou to examine a possible licensure and taxation system for local growers . Amidst sustained, vocal opposition, the proposal stalled for several reasons that further aggravated cultural and racial tensions: A key proponent of licensure was discovered to be running an unauthorized grow, three Hmong Americans died of carbon monoxide poisoning due to heaters in substandard housing, and a cannabis cultivation enterprise run by two Hmong-Americans attempted to bribe the sheriff. These developments were interpreted not as outcomes of restrictive regulations and criminalizing strategies, but as proof that, in the words of one supervisor, regulation was impossible until the county could “get a handle on the illegal side of things.” The sheriff encouraged this interpretation, arguing in an interview that statewide legalization was “just a shield that protects illegal marijuana” and efforts to regulate it would always be subverted by criminals. This anti-regulatory logic prevailed in August 2017 when the county placed a moratorium on cannabis commerce. Still, the sheriff argued for stronger powers, citing an “overwhelming number of cannabis cultivation sites,” which, according to the Sheriff’s Office, continued to “wreak … havoc [with] potentially catastrophic impacts” across the region . Just 1 month later, at the sheriff’s urging, the Siskiyou Board of Supervisors declared a “state of emergency” aimed at garnering new resources and alliances to address the cannabis cultivation problem. Soon, the Sheriff’s Office enlisted the National Guard, Cal Fire and the California Highway Patrol in enforcement efforts, and, by 2018, numerous other agencies joined, including the Siskiyou County Animal Control Department, California Department of Toxic Substances Control, State Water Resources Control Board, California Department of Fish and Wildlife and a CDFA inspection station. These alliances multiplied the civil and criminal charges cultivators might face . Ironically, California’s cannabis legalization has enabled a kind of multi-agency neoprohibitionism at the county level,industrial shelving manufacturers one that reinforces older criminal responses with new civil-administrative strategies and authorities.

The need to “get a handle” might be regarded as a temporary emergency measure, but it may also propagate new criminalizing methods and institutional configurations. The more enforcement occurs, the bigger the problem appears, requiring more resources and leading to a logic of escalation symmetrical to the much-critiqued War on Drugs . And the more cannabis cultivators are viewed as criminal, the less likely they are to be addressed as citizens, residents and farmers.Given concerns about biased county policy and enforcement, the Sheriff’s Office held the first Hmong American and Siskiyou County Leader Town Hall in May 2018 to “foster a closer, collaborative relationship with members of the Hmong-American community,” exchange information about Hmong and Siskiyou culture and educate attendees on county policies . According to public records, racial tensions surfaced at this meeting when some white participants expressed that “our county” had been “invaded” and that Hmong-Americans were not fitting into local cultural norms . Meeting leaders — both government officials and Hmong-Americans — however, identified cultural misunderstanding, rather than criminalization and racialized claims by whites on what constitutes local culture, as the core problem to be addressed. “Misunderstanding” was an inadequate framing, given that Hmong-Americans had attempted to make themselves understood by attending public meetings, forming advocacy groups, signing petitions, demanding interpreters and administrative hearings, and registering to vote since their arrival in Siskiyou. At the 2018 town hall, and numerous prior meetings, they emphasized their status as legitimate community members — veterans, citizens, consumers of county goods, local property owners, “good” growers and medical users — not nuisances, criminals, foreigners or outsiders. In interviews and public forums many Hmong-American cultivators expressed a desire to comply with the rules. Their efforts, however, they said, were frustrated not only by linguistic and cultural differences, but also understaffed and underfunded permitting, licensing and community services agencies. 

Hmong-American cultivators routinely told us about their desires to settle down, build homes and plant other crops. “I’m growing watermelons, pumpkins and tomatoes,” one cultivator told us, but he was waiting for a permit to build his house, a process another interviewee reported took 3 years. Though the town hall meeting sought to address cultural misunderstanding, this framing overlooks how misunderstanding — of Hmong-Americans or cannabis producers generally — is produced by criminalizing enforcement practices. Properties given as gifts in the Hmong-American community were seen as evidence of criminal conspiracy, not generous family assistance; land financing networks evidenced drug trafficking organizations, not kin-based support and weak credit access; repetitive farm organization patterns suggested “organized crime” , not ethnic knowledge-sharing circuits. When Hmong-Americans, leery of engagement with government agencies and unfriendly civic venues, self-provisioned services, including firefighting teams, informal food markets and neighborhood watches, these actions were taken to confirm suspicions that they could not assimilate. Now that some Hmong-Americans are considering, or already are, moving away in response to county efforts, the sheriff’s prior description of them as temporary residents seems prophetically manufactured. These stigmatizing views of Hmong-American cultivators affect all cannabis growers. Anti-cannabis pressure creates a precarious state of impermanence — a season’s crop might be destroyed, infrastructure confiscated and investments of limited resources lost at any moment, disallowing longer-term investments. The impermanence makes noncompliance and deleterious environmental and health effects more likely, thereby perpetuating perceptions of cannabis cultivators as nuisances and dangers. As enforcement makes private land cultivation more risky, cultivators move “back up the hill,” namely onto ecologically sensitive public lands, thus substantiating characterizations of cannabis growers as criminal polluters. These stigmas even spread to county residents who do not grow cannabis themselves but if perceived to assist cannabis cultivation can face social sanctions.

Meanwhile, well-resourced cultivators have an advantage over small-scale producers. They can protect their crops from visibility and complaints by concealing them on large plots of land or inside physical infrastructures ; and for white growers there is the anonymity of not being marked as ethnically different and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. Greater access to capital, land and racial privileges insulates some from visibility and criminalization, resulting in uneven development and disparities in California’s expanding cannabis industry. Additionally, jurisdictions like the Siskiyou municipalities of Mt. Shasta and Weed are welcoming regulated cannabis commerce, thus capitalizing on its expulsion from the rest of Siskiyou and benefiting entrepreneurs with social capital and network access to successfully navigate complex public regulatory systems.After a century of cannabis’s criminal exclusion in California, state voters have elected to integrate cannabis farmers into civil regulation. An important facet of evolving cannabis regulations is local determination. As one interviewee pointed out, a 1-acre farm might be permitted in rural San Joaquin County but would not make sense in downtown San Diego. Yet, when cannabis cultivation is disqualified from consideration as agriculture by localities,industrial sliding shelves as it has been in Siskiyou County, it can be substantively recriminalized and placed beyond the regulatory reach of civil institutions. Prohibitionist strategies that blur lines between civil and criminal enforcement lead to penetrating forms of visibility and vulnerability that produce inequity and disparity. The result, as this case illustrates, can be a narrow, exclusive definition of agriculture that affirms dominant notions of land use and community. The definition of cannabis cultivation as agriculture by the CDFA creates an opportunity for service providers and regulators — including agricultural institutions, public health departments and environmental agencies — to craft programs and policies that openly address the negative impacts of production. Owley advises that “if we treat cultivation of marijuana the same as we treat cultivation of other agricultural crops, we gain stricter regulation of the growing process, including limits on pesticide usage, water pollution, wetland conversion, air pollution, and local land-use laws.” Presently, however, many agencies are being enlisted in locally crafted criminalizing efforts, thus limiting their ability to work cooperatively with cultivators and address issues through customary civil abatement processes.

Though unregulated cannabis cultivation can pose threats to public health, safety and welfare, police enforcement is only one of many possible ways to address it. Siskiyou’s cannabis cultivators experience familiar agricultural challenges around access to land, water and credit. These challenges are amplified without technical assistance or institutional support. If recognized statewide as farmers, these cultivators would be better positioned to access agricultural training and support services, thus addressing ecological and social concerns around cannabis production. Additionally, new cannabis cultivators might be considered “beginning” farmers according to the CDFA, and minority farmers, including Hmong-Americans, who experience poverty at twice the national rate , would be considered “socially disadvantaged” under the California Farmer Equity Act of 2017 . Farmers with these designations would, in fact, be prioritized for technical assistance and support from farm service providers — if, that is, they were recognized as farmers. Uniformly treating cannabis cultivation as agriculture would also help enable the collection of accurate and robust data by researchers. This information base is necessary if agricultural institutions are to take an assistive and educational orientation toward cannabis farmers. Continued enforcement tactics that amplify distrust, frustration and confusion will further hinder data collection , leaving little basis to understand basic dynamics of complex, interdisciplinary systems like agriculture . In a criminalized situation, it is inevitable that information is metered and brokered by community leaders in ways that inhibit full understanding of cannabis cultivation. We suggest, for all these reasons, that a decisive break with enforcement-led, prohibitionist trajectories is needed and that agricultural institutions lead civil policy development and support farmers who cultivate cannabis. Agricultural service providers could play a leadership role in addressing the pressing needs of farmers — both those impacted by and engaging in cannabis cultivation. Yet, UC Agriculture and Natural Resources Cooperative Extension advisors, for instance, consistently report that they are currently prohibited from engaging with cannabis issues . Additionally, many county-based agricultural commissions, Siskiyou County’s included, feel that cannabis is not an agricultural enterprise and therefore do not see its cultivators as their clientele. Without leadership from agricultural institutions and agencies, the expanding cannabis cultivation industry is left to develop unevenly across the state — with wealthy private interests capitalizing in some locales while vulnerable and unregulated growers may retreat, to avoid criminalization, into ecologically sensitive areas. UC ANR and CDFA have an opportunity to fulfill their missions and facilitate, for a burgeoning farming population, greater parity in farmer rights, capacities and resource access. Young children are particularly vulnerable to adverse health effects that may result from pesticide exposures. For example, in utero and/or postnatal chronic exposures to organophosphorous pesticides have been associated with poorer neuro development in children, and altered fetal growth , and shortened gestational duration. Animal studies have also shown that neonatal exposures to other contemporary-use pesticides such as pyrethroids are associated with impaired brain development, changes in open-field behaviors, and increased oxidative stress. Pesticides have been measured in residential environments, most notably in indoor dust.Poor housing conditions in low-income homes, such as overcrowding and housing disrepair, are associated with pest infestations and increased home pesticide use in both urban and agricultural communities, potentially increasing pesticide residues indoors. Additionally, the presence of farm workers in the home and/or proximity of homes to nearby fields in agricultural communities have been associated with higher indoor pesticide concentrations. Several studies indicate that pesticide residues persist indoors due to the lack of sunlight, rain, temperature extremes, microbial action, and other factors that facilitate degradation. Semi- and non-volatile pesticides have chemical properties that increase binding affinity for particles and the tendency to adsorb onto household surfaces such as carpet or dust, also prolonging their persistence indoors. For example, pyrethroid pesticides have low vapor pressures, and high octanol/water and water/organic carbon partition coefficients which facilitate partitioning into lipids and organic matter and binding to particulate matter in dust. Because of this, several studies suggest that house dust is an important pathway of pesticide exposure for children.Young children are particularly vulnerable to inadvertent ingestion of pesticide-contaminated dust due to their frequent hand-to-mouth activity and contact with indoor surfaces. California has intense agricultural pesticide use, including OP insecticides. Due to their potential health effects in children, formulations of the OP insecticides, chlorpyrifos and diazinon, were voluntarily phased out for residential uses between 2001 and 2004.

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The HLC was performed in four randomly selected houses per month by adult male volunteers

Posted on September 8, 2023 by hemp2022

Moreover, farm workers may be more susceptible to extreme heat illness due to risk factors such as low-income, male gender, migration status, type of work at the farm, and pre-existing illness, including potentially related cardiovascular disease, kidney disease, and diabetes . These negative impacts of heat on agricultural workers are significant and continue to increase due to a warming climate and growing demand for agricultural labor in fertile agricultural areas of the U.S., particularly during the harvesting months, which coincide with the most extreme conditions. Research shows that the physical work capacity of an agricultural laborer lowers as the air temperature, humidity, and sunlight increase . Thus, as more agricultural laborers are hired to compensate for lost work productivity, a greater number of vulnerable outdoor workers are negatively impacted by heat and require essential coping resources .Despite a burgeoning literature on COVID-19, more research is needed to address the burden of COVID-19 in concert with anomalous heat, labor productivity, and laborers’ health and livelihoods. We discussed potential pathways of how heat can impact COVID-19 morbidity and mortality and vice versa. We argue that this twin burden further impacts labor productivity and farm worker livelihoods in an insidious cycle, exceeding the sum of each illness independently. More research integrating the two topics is warranted. Many largely unanswered questions remain to be examined by researchers. For example, under what circumstances does COVID-19 lead to increased heat health challenges? Specifically, to what extent does mask-wearing, social distancing,vertial sliding shelves and individualized water consumption lead to COVID- 19 heat stress? To what degree may there be a connection between long-haul COVID and heat susceptibility and associated consequences in labor productivity? What other factors may impact heat health challenges?

More research is needed also to address the impacts of heat stress on COVID-19 morbidity and mortality. For example, to what extent does heat stress induced immunodeficiency facilitate COVID-19 infection? To what extent is heat stress likely to reduce mask wearing and therefore increase COVID-19 infection rates? To what degree does extreme heat lead to increased use of air-conditioning, subsequent concentration of aerosols in an enclosed space and ultimately, to potentially increased COVID-19 prevalence? What other heat-related health factors might exacerbate COVID-19 morbidity and mortality? The dearth of data on these topics calls for new empirical field research combining surveys and interviews with climatological data. Beyond the knowledge gap and opportunity for researchers on the topic, direct policy implications result from this dual burden. The similarity of socio-economic and labor impacts of COVID-19 and heat stress, allows policymakers to design and implement policies for both with a broader impact on farm workers’ well being. For example, unemployment benefits, if implemented for farm workers, can have a broader positive impact on the target population as they recover from either or both health conditions. Consideration of the expansion of worksite policies such as expanding paid sick leave for impacted workers could also be useful. Lessons learned from implementing policies related to heat stress may provide guidance for policies related to COVID-19. Therefore, public health policies and workplace, acclimatization protocols can be informed in ways that ameliorate suffering from both COVID-19 and cognate infectious diseases as well as heat stress. These strategies must be place-based to assess and lessen both burdens as they intersect with outdoor labor conditions, farm worker related health needs, and cultural aspects of policy implementation and farm worker outreach. Intervention points or policy levers can be leveraged suitably. For example, the timing of worksite vaccination campaigns can be planned to coincide with workplace heat prevention acclimatization protocols, raising awareness among workers and employers about the dangers of both stressors.

Understanding the intersection of COVID-19 and climate change via heat stress results in an opportunity for policy makers to design and implement policies that may have greater impact when addressing the health and socio-economic impacts of both occurrences.Malaria remains one of the most serious vector-borne diseases, affecting hundreds of millions of people mainly in the sub-Saharan Africa including Ethiopia. Yet unprecedented success has been achieved over the past two decades in reducing the disease burden, averting an estimated 663 million malaria cases in Africa between 2001 and 2015 . Vector control is one of the key elements in achieving the remarkable reduction in malaria, with long-lasting insecticidal nets and indoor residual spraying estimated to have averted 68% and 10% of the cases, respectively . Similarly, morbidity and mortality due to malaria has remarkably declined in Ethiopia over the past decade as a result of large-scale distribution of LLINs and high coverage of IRS, together with nationwide implementation of artemisin in-based combination therapy . Based these gains, the country has set goals to eliminate malaria by 2030 and the elimination program is being implemented in 239 selected low malaria transmission districts encompassing six different regions . More than 11 million LLINs have been distributed through mass campaigns in 2018 alone to further reduce malaria cases and accelerate the progress towards elimination . However, malaria transmission continues to occur and still remains a significant public health problem in Ethiopia despite the progress made in scaling up of the control measures . This transmission could be attributed to several factors including the spread of insecticide resistance and preference of malaria vectors to bite outdoors and in the early evening when people are indoors but unprotected by existing tools . The current indoor-based malaria vector control interventions such as LLINs offer protection from anthropophagic and endophagic vectors, but have little impact on vector species predominantly feeding on animals and humans outdoors . In Ethiopia, the primary vector of malaria is An. arabiensis.

This vector species has a peculiar feature in that it can readily feed on humans to sustain intense malaria transmission , but often enough on animals to evade the effect of LLINs and IRS, and to maintain residual malaria transmission . Such dual feeding preference of An. arabiensis could pose another challenge to malaria control and elimination efforts as malaria transmission may continue even with a high coverage of the current vector control interventions . Moreover,vertical farming supplies the feeding behavior of An. arabiensis could vary in different eco-epidemiological settings depending on several factors including host availability and the genetic structure of the vector itself . In addition to the vector behavior, human habits and sleeping patterns could also be vital determinants of malaria transmission since exposure to malaria vector bites occurs when unprotected people and vector biting activities overlap in time and space . Addressing the challenge of residual malaria transmission on malaria elimination efforts requires better understanding of both the local vector and human behavior. Moreover, quantifying the magnitude of human exposure to infectious mosquito bites which occurs indoors and outdoors is crucial to evaluate the likely success of the current vector control measures . However, most vector surveillance activities in Ethiopia focused mainly on vector behavior with less or no attention to human behavior that also contributes to residual malaria transmission. The aim of this study was to assess vector behavior, patterns of human exposure to mosquito bites and residual malaria transmission in southwestern Ethiopia. The study was carried out in Bulbul kebele , which is located in Kersa district, Jimma Zone 320 km southwest of the capital, Addis Ababa . The inhabitants mostly rely on subsistence farming, with maize and teff being the main cultivated crops in the area. Most houses are mud-walled with roofs made of corrugated iron sheets. Malaria transmission is seasonal in Bulbul area. The transmission peaks from September to October, following the major rains from June to September. Minor transmission occurs in April and May, following the short rains of February to March. Plasmodium falciparum and Plasmodium vivax are the two predominant malaria parasite species co-occurring in the area and are transmitted mainly by An. arabiensis .Adult mosquito collections were carried out monthly from January to December 2018. Host-seeking mosquitoes were collected both indoors and outdoors using human landing catches , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention miniature light traps and human-baited double net traps . Indoor resting mosquitoes were collected using pyrethrum spray catches .For each house, two collectors seated on stools with their legs exposed from foot to knee to capture mosquitoes as soon as they land on the exposed legs before they commence blood-feeding using a flashlight and mouth aspirator .

There were two collection shifts: one team worked from 18:00 to 24:00 hr during each collection night, followed by the second team from 24:00 to 06:00 hr. Each hour’s collection was kept separately in labeled paper cups. A supervisor was assigned to coordinate the collection activities and watch volunteers not to fall asleep during the collection nights. All collectors were provided with anti-malarial prophylaxis to avoid a risk of contracting malaria during the collection period. Mosquitoes were identified to species the next morning. The CDC light traps were set indoors beside human-occupied bed nets in other four randomly selected houses monthly and paired with outdoor HDNT. Details of the HDNT are described elsewhere . Both traps were set from 18:00 to 6:00 hr during each collection night. The PSC was conducted monthly in twenty randomly selected houses from 06:00 to 09:00 hr following standard protocol . All collected mosquitoes were identified morphologically to species or species complexes using a dichotomous key described by Gillies and De Meillon . Female Anopheles mosquitoes were further classified as unfed, freshly fed, half-gravid and gravid. Each mosquito was kept individually in a labeled 1.5 ml Eppendorf tube containing silica gel desiccant. Samples were stored at −20°C freezer at Jimma University Tropical and Infectious Diseases Research Center Laboratory until used for further processing.This study indicated that An. pharoensis was the most abundant anopheline species in the study area followed by An. arabiensis and An. coustani. Previous studies reported that An. arabiensis was the predominant species in different malaria endemic settings of southwestern Ethiopia . The higher abundance of An. pharoensis over An. arabiensis in this study could be attributed to difference in mosquito breeding habitats. The present study area is located in the Omo-Gibe River Basin with abundant aquatic vegetations that might have favoured An. pharoensis. Anopheles pharoensis prefers to breed in vegetated swamps unlike An. arabiensis which typically breeds in small, sunlit temporary water pools . Anopheles arabiensis exhibited exophagic behavior, seeking hosts mostly outdoors rather than indoors. Similar findings were also reported from different parts of Ethiopia . Anopheles arabiensis was shown to be preponderantly exophagic even before the scale up of indoor based vector control interventions in Ethiopia , suggesting that the exophagic behavior of this species might be genetically determined . Moreover, the long-term use of the current vector control interventions might have further enhanced the proportion of outdoor biting fraction of An. arabiensis as observed elsewhere in Africa. For instance in western Kenya, An. arabiensis was more likely to bite outdoors when compared with data collected before the scale-up of LLINs . Likewise, An. pharoensis showed exophagic behavior in the study area. Similar findings were also reported for this species from different parts of Ethiopia . In the absence of personal protection by LLINs, human exposure to An. arabiensis bites occurred mostly indoors despite the outdoor host-seeking preference of this species. This is due to coincidence of humans and the peak biting activities of An. arabiensis since most people spend their time indoors when this species is mostly active . A similar phenomenon was documented for other malaria vector species in Africa . For instance, An. funestus and An. quadriannulatus did not show preference to bite indoors in Zambia, yet a substantial proportion of human contact with both species was shown to occur indoors in the absence of LLIN use in the country . This highlights the need to consider human behavior to determine the actual magnitude of human exposure to mosquito bites which may occur indoors and/or outdoors. For LLIN non-users, 56% of human exposure to An. arabiensis bites occurred at times when using LLINs is feasible, indicating that the maximum possible personal protection that could be provided by LLIN is 56%.

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CFT was one of the lead growers’ groups in developing a relationship with health advocates

Posted on September 7, 2023 by hemp2022

Tobacco manufacturers preferred to maintain the quota and price support systems, because the system gave them considerable flexibility and control over the market with the fall back of the price support system for growers. Manufacturers argued that the cost of eliminating the program and compensating quota holders would have exceeded the amount gained for manufacturers by lower prices achieved without a price support system. The disparate positions of growers and manufacturers over the regulation of the tobacco market was the root of a series of conflicts between 1997 and 2004 which distanced tobacco companies from their traditional grower allies.At the same time, health groups nationwide began to push for the inclusion of tobacco within the regulatory purview of the federal Food and Drug Administration . Health groups, particularly the Washington DC-based Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and the voluntary health organizations leveraged the distance between tobacco growers and tobacco manufacturers over a quota buyout to garner growers’ support for FDA regulation of tobacco products in exchange for support of a quota buyout. Building tobacco control alliances with growers increased the impression among tobacco growers that their interests were divergent from those of manufacturers. Public health groups had already begun a partnership with tobacco growers at the urging of President Bill Clinton to find ways to limit smoking while protecting tobacco producing communities, resulting in the March 1998 Core Principles document signed by prominent grower and public health organizations.The first serious consideration of a tobacco quota buyout took place within the context of the 1997 proposed “global tobacco settlement” of multi-state lawsuits against the tobacco companies seeking compensation for Medicaid expenditures of tobacco-related illnesses. This “global tobacco settlement” took the form of the U.S. Senate’s consideration of the controversial “McCain bill,” commercial racking system which was eventually defeated, setting the foundation for the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.

The McCain bill would have included both FDA regulation of tobacco and a quota buyout plan as well as de facto immunity from future lawsuits for the manufacturers. Tobacco companies secured the support of many tobacco growing organizations to join them in opposing the McCain bill and its quota buyout provisions by promising a $28 billion payout to growers under a separate settlement.The McCain bill failed to pass and was replaced by the private Master Settlement Agreement , which included a separate settlement between manufacturers and tobacco growers to compensate growers for potential loss of revenue associated with the MSA’s provisions, known as Phase II. However, under the MSA’s Phase II payments to tobacco growers, the growers were to receive only $5.2 billion, not the promised $28 billion. This failure by tobacco manufacturers to stand by their agreement with growers led to the first major break of the manufacturer-grower organization alliance. In early 2000, tobacco farmers filed a classaction lawsuit against cigarette manufacturers, DeLoach vs. Philip Morris, alleging that the tobacco companies misled farmers when they encouraged them to oppose the removal of the quota system and accused manufacturers of rigging the federal price support system to keep prices low. This suit was settled by Philip Morris and other major tobacco companies in 2003 and by RJR in 2004, after 175,000 tobacco farmers had joined the suit, providing approximately $254 million to those growers .In March 2000, Philip Morris exacerbated existing tensions with growers by announcing that it had developed a direct contract system for purchasing burley tobacco, under which they would arrange to buy a set amount of tobacco from a specific grower at a set price, circumventing the Tobacco Price Support System by setting the price and purchasing the tobacco prior to the tobacco reaching federally-controlled auctions. The direct contract system provided little protection and high risks for farmers compared with the federal tobacco program, and the expansion of this program would undermine the quota and price support system further by manipulating both supply and demand outside the system.

Philip Morris began executing this system in 2000 over opposition by most growers and grower organizations. Despite the decreasing importance of domestic tobacco farming to the tobacco industry, tobacco growers represented an important source of legitimacy for the tobacco manufacturers’ political goals. Therefore, despite the increasing divergence between the two groups, maintaining a seemingly close relationship was beneficial to the tobacco companies because, as one Philip Morris representative put it in 1990, “local growers have more credibility in legislatures than do hired guns.”The importance of the relationship also extended outside of merely legitimizing their lobbying efforts, resonating in the public sphere as an important public relations tool. Thus it was in the tobacco industry’s best interest to maintain an appearance of commonality with tobacco growers, despite the underlying tensions over quotas. Nationwide and in Virginia, the net effect on farmers was that many immediately stopped producing tobacco. Moreover, the remaining production was consolidated on fewer but larger farms. Finally, some Virginia production of flue-cured tobacco, free from the geographical constraints of the quota system, moved to regions with lower production costs such as North Carolina.Tobacco control advocates capitalized on the growing animosity between growers and tobacco companies over the quota buyout and concerns among tobacco growers about declining demand for U.S.-grown tobacco.One outcome of this growing rift between farmers and the tobacco industry was the creation of the Southern Tobacco Communities Project , an attempt by tobacco control advocates to discover areas of common interest. An implied goal of the health groups in the STCP discussions was to alter the historical hostility of tobacco farmers towards tobacco control issues. The predecessor of the STCP was the Virginia Tobacco Communities project, a 16-month project from 1994 to 1996 initiated by health advocates, including the Institute for Quality Health, American Cancer Society and Virginia Department of Health with a similar purpose, seeking common ground with tobacco farmers and farming communities.The University of Virginia’s Institute for Environmental Negotiation provided independent facilitation between these health groups and the tobacco growing community representatives that they reached out to. VTC leveraged the mission of the Virginia House Joint Subcommittee Studying Alternative Strategies for Assisting Tobacco Farmers, which had been established prior to the formation of VTC, as a vehicle to reach out to tobacco farmers. VTC members attended Subcommittee sessions and used the time to build informal contacts in the farming community, and VTC’s participation in the Subcommittee lent the project credibility among farmers.VTC’s primary strategy was to create an ongoing dialogue between diverse interests through roundtable meetings, intended to react to and analyze the chances in tobacco communities.A total of five round table meetings were held and resulted in an exchange of knowledge between advocates and tobacco growers. Ultimately, VTC presented four main legislative recommendations to the Virginia House Joint Subcommittee Studying Alternative Strategies for Assisting Tobacco Farmers: 1) improvements in production and marketing of tobacco; 2) improving access to information about profitable supplemental on-farm enterprises; 3) improving access to financing for small business development; 4) increasing access to education for employment in specific non-tobacco growing work sectors.Additional lessons and findings from the VTC appear in Table 52. The VTC project led to the creation of the Southern Tobacco Communities Project in 1997 funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and,indoor farming equipment like VTC, was managed by the Institute for Quality Health, a division of the University of Virginia’s Department of Health Services.

The program was facilitated by the Institute for Environmental Negotiation, a part of the University of Virginia whose mission was to promote conflict resolution and consensus building, building on the work that had previously been done by the VTC.STCP brought together regional leaders from public health and tobacco interests with the goal of promoting health in rural southern communities.The STCP collaborative project eventually led in 1998 to release of the “Core Principles Statement,” a memorandum of understanding that outlined areas of agreement between the farmers and health advocacy groups. Health advocates would push for the continuation of the tobacco quota system and for funds to be secured for tobacco community diversification. Farming interests agreed to support tobacco control goals supported by federal taxes, FDA regulation of tobacco products, and marketing programs aimed at reducing youth smoking rates.After the Master Settlement Agreement was announced, Southern farmers and grower organizations began a dialogue with health advocates under the auspices of STCP concerning how to best utilize the incoming MSA funds for their respective interests that was initiated by STCP. An agreement was reached to introduce a bill, HB 2635, that embodied the understanding of the parties: 50% of the incoming MSA funds would be directed towards tobacco-dependent communities, to be administered by the Virginia Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission and Fund ; 10% of the funds would be used for youth-prevention oriented tobacco control work, eventually conducted by the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation after its formation in 1999 ; the remaining 40% of the funds were not earmarked and their distribution was to be left to the Virginia legislature. STCP considered the negotiations surrounding the use of MSA funds as a major success that balanced the needs of tobacco farming communities and public health advocates.However, this position ignores the fact that no MSA funds were directed towards general tobacco control advocacy, because the establishment of the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation used all the MSA funds earmarked for tobacco control for youth-targeted efforts. Therefore, the use of the MSA funds as negotiated by STCP was not as effective in promoting public health goals as it might have been had MSA funds been utilized to fund tobacco control efforts for all Virginians. The meetings that led up to this agreement included many of the representative groups from STCP. The tobacco farmers were represented at the meetings by the Farm Bureau, the FlueCured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative, the Tobacco Growers’ Association, and the National Black Farmers Association.Some traditional tobacco industry allies, like the Farm Bureau described their new relationship with their former foe as a strange result of circumstance. One Farm Bureau member observed to the press at the announcement of the formation of STCP, “You’ve seen how dogs and cats are sometimes found to depend on each other. There’s a little bit of that going on here.” However, Al Glass, a Farm Bureau director, noted at the same time some of the advantages of the meetings, saying that health advocates have “learned a lot about tobacco farming. They always saw Joe Camel and the Marlboro man – they never saw an economic community scattered through ten states.”A leader among the farmers was Clarence D. Bryant III of Virginia, the founder of the Concerned Friends of Tobacco , a group that has organized in 1993 to combat a federal cigarette taxation proposal by President Bill Clinton to fund his health care reform package.Bryant served as one of the farmers’ representatives and was a farmer himself. Bryant characterized the growers’ interest in working with STCP as a way to secure funds for farmers, to serve as “insurance to protect us, because everything was being created [by the MSA] between the industry and the states and we were caught in the middle.”One reason for farmers’ interest in STCP according to Andrew Shepherd, a representative of the Virginia Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, was the increasing importation of foreign tobacco, which lead to a decline in domestic purchasing and hit farmers in the pocketbooks.Bill Novelli, President of the Washington, DC-based Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids , noted that both growers and health advocates had realized their notions about tobacco farming had evolved from thinking of the growers as being in lockstep with the manufacturers “regardless of the consequences” to realizing the inherent friction in the relationship. Additionally, Novelli said that “the public health community has come to better understand that tobacco producers, their families, and the people in their communities have a very different set of values than do the tobacco companies.”Shepherd noted that “meetings between [health advocates and growers], away from the rhetoric of politicians … led to the realization that many of us on both sides had similar concerns.”JT Davis, a member of the Concerned Friends for Tobacco organization, also felt upbeat about the meetings, stating, “This is truly a unique win-win situation. Direct, face-to-face discussion invariably results in new, more accurate understandings.”

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Elections would be held in November and all 100 members of the House were up for reelection

Posted on September 6, 2023 by hemp2022

Whibley was frustrated as four council members had changed their minds four months after voting the initial passage of the ordinance, comparing it to the failure of the General Assembly to pass smoking restrictions that Virginians overwhelmingly supported: “We dropped the ball like they did.”Soon afterwards, Lorene Alba of the ALA, Hilton Oliver of Virginia GASP, and Katie Pepe of ACS went on the record to question the Council’s reasoning. Hilton Oliver pointed out the fallacy of one of the main rationales in reversing the ordinance, that it would harm business, saying “[f]or every Norfolk resident who goes to a Virginia Beach restaurant to smoke, you’ll get four or five people from Virginia Beach.”After rescinding the ordinance, Norfolk did not consider a local smoking proposal again in light of the pending statewide law. The reversal of the Norfolk city council has parallels with tobacco industry efforts in other states, notably in California. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several California localities attempted to enact local smoking restrictions. In 1990, the Los Angeles city council considered a total smoking prohibition in all restaurants in the city, a proposal which had been developed internally without prompting by tobacco control groups . The tobacco industry mobilized restaurateurs and smokers rights groups to oppose the legislation, and were successful because the voluntary health organizations were inactive on the issue.Because of a lack of sustained activity by health groups, the ordinance was defeated by the tobacco industry.In contrast, 1990 smoking restrictions in the city and county of Sacramento both succeeded despite significant industry opposition due to the concerted efforts of the ALA, which worked closely with city council members to educate them about the scientific harms of secondhand smoke.While the role of the tobacco industry in influencing the city council in Norfolk was unclear,vertical farm systems the health groups did not take any significant action to counter the claims of harm to restaurants that apparently influenced the council.

While VFHF provided technical support testimony at Norfolk City Council hearings in support of Whibley’s proposal, VFHF felt that Norfolk was hamstrung by the Attorney General’s opinion that Norfolk could not restrict smoking on their own.Cathleen Grzesiek, interviewed in 2010, felt that challenging the Attorney General’s opinion would require a costly lawsuit that VFHF could not afford.Despite the important precedential value of the Norfolk ordinance, VFHF chose to focus instead on state level smoking restrictions. With funding to properly support Norfolk’s innovative strategy by challenging the Attorney General’s opinion in court, public health advocates in Virginia could create a precedent for local action. During the discussions among the Norfolk city council concerning their proposed ordinance, Norfolk became part of an attempt to unite the surrounding Hampton Roads region in pushing for restaurant smoking restrictions. The discussions were headed by two council members, Barclay Winn from Norfolk and Rosemary Wilson from Virginia Beach. The proposal would have brought a unified block of around one million Hampton Roads constituents to bear on the General Assembly.The discussions included the cities of Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Portsmouth, and Chesapeake.All of the Hampton Roads cities except Norfolk determined that in order to introduce stronger restaurant smoking restrictions, they would have to ask the General Assembly to enact a law granting them the power to do so. After Norfolk’s efforts to enact their own separate ordinance fell apart in 2008 all of the cities agreed that asking for permission from the General Assembly was the correct approach. This push led several legislators to introduce bills sought to grant localities the ability to exceed statewide smoking restrictions in restaurants. Despite the regional effort in Hampton Roads, most of the bills did not specifically apply to one region, and would grant preemption restrictions to most or all localities in Virginia . None of the bills survived. There were some important changes in Virginia’s political climate in 2009 that increased the chances that health advocates would be able to enact legislation that year.This election coincided with a rise in Democratic influence in Virginia – Gov. Tim Kaine was elected in 2006 and Virginia supported Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama, the first time a Democratic presidential candidate had taken Virginia since 1964. Democrats were gaining influence, especially in suburban Northern Virginia.

Finally, House Speaker William Howell felt that his seat in his Fredericksburg district was vulnerable because it was becoming less conservative. Some House Republicans, most of all Howell, felt that they needed to project a different image. It is likely that this was a significant source of pressure upon Howell, and coupled with the VFHF campaign discussed below, caused him to shift his position on tobacco control legislation. In addition, the party in power after the election would be able to control redistricting in their chamber. Because the Democrats controlled the Senate, it was a political imperative for Republicans in the House to retain control.210 In addition, during the 2009 session some important changes were made to the composition of the House General Laws committee, namely that Del. Chris Jones replaced Terrie Suit who had retired, as the chairperson of the committee. The VFHF coalition, who had been repeatedly disappointed by the HGL’s consistent propensity to kill tobacco control legislation, felt hopeful that Jones would influence the committee to approach such legislation in a different light.Jones had openly supported clean indoor air legislation and also had stated his desire that clean indoor air bills be heard in the full committee.Prior to beginning the 2009 legislative session, VFHF decided to target Speaker Howell’s Fredericksburg district with pressure from their grassroots elements to force him to stop assigning legislation to the hostile ABC/Gaming subcommittee of the House General Laws Committee and allow it such bills to be heard in the full committee.They intended to capitalize on Howell’s vulnerability before the 2009 elections in a district that was becoming less conservative. VFHF hired a district organizer, Adam Bray, whose background was in community organizing around worker justice issues, to identify and mobilize constituents in and around the Fredericksburg district with phone banking and grassroots action. During the American Cancer Society’s Great American Smoke out in November 2008, Bray and VFHF took out a large ad in the Fredericksburg Free Lance–Star urging readers to call Howell and ask him to “make Virginia smoke free” . The campaign was successful in pressuring Howell, who reportedly referenced Bray’s campaign in a legislative caucus,industrial rack systems saying something to the effect of, “[if] they’re going to do this to me, what else could they do?”Howell sought out Gov. Kaine and they ultimately agreed in principle to a “compromise” restaurant smoking bill that allowed for smoking rooms and ventilation. Howell changed his position on clean indoor air bills directly because of the Fredericksburg grassroots campaign. Had VFHF been able to implement this tactic on a larger scale, it might have lead to a stronger restaurant smoking bill. VFHF was unable to do this because in 2009 they could only afford to hire a single district organizer;using their limited funds, they targeted the legislator who would have the greatest impact for the money spent.

Despite the antipathy of the Virginia Restaurant Association , many restaurant owners supported the idea of comprehensive clean indoor air legislation covering restaurants. The largest restaurant organization to start supporting restaurant smoking restrictions was the Virginia Beach Restaurant Association . One of the more active restaurateurs in Virginia supporting restaurant smoking restrictions was Matt Falvey, a Virginia Beach restaurant and owner of several restaurants including Hot Tuna and Shore break and former president of the VBRA. Falvey had made his three restaurants smoke free in 2007. In a 2009 interview, Falvey explained that he supported smoking restrictions in restaurants for several reasons. First, it was a public relations move; noting vocal public support for restaurant smoking restrictions, Falvey felt it would help VBRA members to support rather than oppose further restrictions.He also was unhappy that workers in some workplaces in Virginia were protected from secondhand smoke and that restaurant and bar workers were not. He felt that voluntary restaurant smoking restrictions were ineffective. In addition, Falvey knew that restaurant associations generally resisted any additional regulation and that libertarian attitudes about individual business rights were prevalent among Virginia restaurateurs. Without guidance from a group like the VBRA, Falvey felt that restaurateurs would have a “knee-jerk reaction” and fight further regulation of smoking in restaurants.As a member of VHTA, Falvey’s advocacy for smoke-free restaurants led the VHTA to stop opposing clean indoor air legislation for one year, during the 2003 session. After VHTA returned to active opposition in 2005, Falvey and other VHTA members resigned and took their concerns to the VBRA.236 The VBRA embraced the tobacco control position and approached Sen. Bell to support SB 1161.Bell put the VBRA members in touch with the VFHF, and the VBRA joined the VFHF coalition in 2007.Falvey lobbied for VBRA members to support VFHF efforts by arguing that, despite the traditional opposition of restaurateurs to any government regulation, that smoking was “the one area that is a major health concern that [the government] had chosen not to regulate us,” which was unfair to restaurant workers and patrons.Falvey also argued that restaurants did not share a common interest in fighting this particular regulation with the tobacco industry, because the tobacco industry was using restaurants to be “the face of anti-tobacco legislation. They’re kind of standing back.”Falvey also had some early contact with VFHF, but particularly with Keenan Caldwell, the ACS co-chair of VFHF, who worked with Falvey and others. However, Falvey was more supportive of local incremental progress than were the voluntary health organization advocates, which was a source of disagreement.HB 1703 was offered by Del. John Cosgrove on January 14, 2009 and was similar to a bill he had filed in 2007. Instead of the VICAA requirement of reasonable smoking in government owned or operated buildings, smoking was prohibited. Restaurants with 50 more seats constructed prior to July 1, 2010, were still required to have a no-smoking area “sufficient to meet customer demand.” Restaurants constructed after July 1, 2010, would be required to confine smoking to a structurally separate, ventilated smoking room. Additionally, there was a provision that required employee consent before a worker would be required to work in a smoking area. HB 1703 was not a strong tobacco control bill. The employees and patrons of all restaurants existing before July 1, 2010, were not protected. Restaurants built after that date would allow smoking in ventilated smoking rooms, an ineffective protection against the harms of secondhand smoke.The bill would have done little to protect the health of Virginians. Cosgrove had been traditionally hostile to tobacco control legislation, but credited his choice to sponsor HB 1703 to constituent pressure, pointing to VFHF-sponsored polling data that showed a large margin of support for such legislation.270 Introducing a bill like HB 1703 that gives the appearance of strengthening tobacco control laws while providing little substance is a standard tobacco industry tactic to undermine effective smoking restrictions. HB 2483 was introduced by Del. Albert Eisenberg as a “minors provision” law. Eisenberg’s bill would allow smoking in any restaurant or bar that posted signs that prohibited minors, with up to a $250 fine for violation by the proprietor. However, the proprietor was given affirmative defenses, preventing liability if the proprietor had asked the minor to leave the establishment. The bill also did not prevent minors from being in outdoor areas of restaurants or bars that allowed smoking. SB 1382 introduced by Sen. Kenneth Stolle was also a “minors provision” bill. The bill prohibited smoking in restaurants, except those that only allowed entry to persons 18 years of age or older. It allowed any bar, or bar area of a restaurant, to allow smoking. All restaurants built after July 1, 2009, could only allow smoking in designated smoking rooms. If any restaurant allowed smoking, they were required to have a no-smoking area of an unspecified size. The fine schedule for violations was similar to HB 2483, and proprietors were allowed an affirmative defense to violation if the proprietor had asked the violator to move from the prohibited area and posted signs stating “No Smoking” and minors were prohibited in designated smoking rooms. This “minors provision” language was a variation of the standard industry “red light, green light” tactic.

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VFHF noted in its announcement that support for the tax was strong throughout Virginia

Posted on September 5, 2023 by hemp2022

Virginia’s involvement in SLS helped to bring tobacco farming interests and tobacco control advocates together in the Southern Tobacco Communities Project , which led to the “Core Principles Statement Between the Public Health Communities and the Tobacco Producers,” a memorandum of understanding between regional farming and tobacco control interests on the tobacco control policy areas that the farming interests represented by the STCP would support.Advocates and farmers agreed that a significant infusion of money be made available to tobacco growing communities. They also agreed that tobacco products should not be marketed or sold to minors, that a portion of federal cigarette excise taxes should be used for public health initiatives if a portion is dedicated to farming communities, and that the “prohibition of the use of tobacco products by informed adults of legal age is not a goal of the public health advocates or tobacco producers.”The understandings embodied in the Core Principles led both health advocates and farmers to support the division of MSA funding between tobacco community revitalization and youth tobacco prevention programming. This agreement led to the formation of the Virginia Tobacco Settlement Foundation and the Virginia Tobacco Indemnification and Revitalization Commission in 1999 . The SLS grant ended in 2004. After SLS, RWJF created a new national tobacco control funding program, called “Tobacco Policy Change: A Collaborative for Healthier Communities and States.” There was no continuity with SLS in staffing or in its specific mission.Tobacco Policy Change looked at the results from the SLS grant to identify where disparities in tobacco use still existed, and focused on those areas.In Virginia, AHA applied for a Tobacco Policy Change grant, but were denied after RWJF conducted a site visit.In Virginia,rolling track shelving systems sporadic attempts to raise the statewide cigarette tax from 1966 levels occurred in the decade before 1990, but only around the time that the statewide Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act was passed in 1990 did the number of attempts increase.

At that time, Virginia faced a budget deficit that reflected the economic downturn of the time. Estimated at around $1.4 billion in 1990 , the deficit came at a time when the political leadership under Gov. Douglas Wilder generally resisted tax increases of any sort and attempted to balance the budget using program cuts. However, RJ Reynolds came to the conclusion that some form of statewide excise tax increase was possible in 1990-1991 due to the severity of Virginia’s budget crisis. The industry sought to utilize use its lobbying strength, as well as inherent political opposition to taxation at the state level, to combat state tax increases. Thus, the early attempts at increasing the cigarette tax met with failure. For example, in 1990, Del. Dudley Emick introduced a cigarette tax bill, SB 414, which sought to increase the statewide tax from 2.5 cents to 5 cents, to generate $14 million for medical services for about 880,000, people without health insurance.Opponents decried it as a “version of socialized medicine” and Emick’s proposal was tabled indefinitely in the Senate Education and Health Committee soon after being introduced.There is no evidence that public health groups were involved with Emick’s proposal. A case study in the interplay between powerful tobacco industry interests and tobacco control advocates can be found in the 1992 session, where the industry fought off several tax proposals despite a sense among legislators that an increase was likely. 1992 was a transitional session, with the state mired in a deep recession along with the rest of the country. Additionally, several powerful tobacco industry legislative allies were no longer present. Del. A.J. Philpott , the powerful House Speaker who protected tobacco interests, had died the previous year. Additionally, a powerful industry voice in the Senate, Howard Anderson, Jr. , had retired. Anderson’s tenure as Chairperson of the Senate Finance subcommittee during the early 1990s was characterized by a systematic opposition to any tobacco tax proposals. Redistricting had increased the number of urban legislators, diluting the traditionally pro-tobacco rural General Assembly contingent.It was in this environment that the State Board of Health attempted to push a tax increase.

A wide range of tobacco industry interests, business associations and labor unions arrayed themselves against cigarette excise taxes for the 1992 session. James Frye, a lobbyist for Philip Morris, described to the media that the industry had established coalition of groups lobbying against taxes as a “vital economic bulwark in Virginia.”The coalition at this time included the Virginia Tobacco Growers’ Association, the AFL-CIO, the Virginia Farm Bureau, the Virginia Agribusiness Council, the Virginia Wholesalers and Distributors Association, the Virginia Food Dealers Association, the tobacco companies themselves, and suppliers like Reynolds Metals Co.Before the 1992 session began, Virginia’s Board of Health proposed a 24 cent per pack increase in the excise tax. The rationale for the increase was health concerns; Board members testified before legislators about the health problems stemming from cigarette use and argued that the revenues from a tax increase be used for healthcare. However, the Board did not have any paid lobbyists and their efforts were limited to having Board members testify or call on legislators directly. In addition, the Tri-Agency Council declined to take a position on the Board of Health’s proposal, characterizing it as an “economic” issue. Without the lobbying support of tobacco control advocates or any effective lobbying power of their own, the proposal died without even being introduced into the legislature in the face of determined tobacco industry opposition.The primary goal of the 2002 campaign was a 60-cent increase, which, if implemented, would place Virginia close to the national average.The additional revenue would have been used to offset the budget deficit, with no specific funding for tobacco control, although VFHF welcomed the secondary benefit of discouraging smoking initiation. One of the primary individuals working on this campaign was Donna Reynolds, community relations director for the ALA.Reynolds had previously participated in the Southern Communities Tobacco Project and had established relationships with some of the tobacco farmer representatives that participated in STCP, particularly the Concerned Friends for Tobacco , a Virginia-based political action committee.CFT adopted a position that they would “not oppose” tobacco tax legislation, and informed legislators of this position.Additionally, Cathleen Grzesiek recalled in a 2009 interview that some individual tobacco farmers helped with VFHF’s tobacco tax campaign.

However, other farming groups, notably the Farm Bureau, staunchly opposed any tobacco tax increase .Others involved in the VFHF tax campaign included contract lobbyists for the Virginia chapters of the national voluntary health organizations and staff lobbyists Keenan Caldwell and Cathleen Grzesiek .The “2.5 Cents to Common Sense” campaign for a 60-cent increase utilized several tactics, including press releases and other messaging emphasizing that the state had “the lowest cigarette excise tax in the nation and that the state had to move from ‘2.5 Cents to Common Sense.’” The campaign identified three elected officials, the governor, Senate Finance Committee Chair, and the House Majority Leader, as the key figures who needed to be swayed in order to increase the tax. To put pressure on these figures, the coalition utilized pamphlets,customizable shelving system radio and TV advertising and a website.In addition, VFHF had recruited a large number of groups to support their tax increase campaign through grassroots efforts, and activities such as providing testimony at public hearings .In early January 2003, the coalition reiterated its call for higher taxes, calling a press conference to call attention to the health benefits of raising the tax. Warner struck a cautious tone, repeating his position from the previous year that he would consider increasing “sin taxes” to balance the budget, but would not spearhead any such measure. Ultimately, two bills were endorsed by VFHF in the 2003 session: HB 2796 by Del. Mitchell Van Yahres and SB 1113 by Sen. Mary Margaret Whipple D – Arlington, Policy Score 10.0, Total Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions: $1,000. Both intended to raise the tax to a total of 60 cents. SB 1113 stalled and subsequently died in the Senate Finance Committee soon after being introduced. HB 2796 met the same fate in the House Finance Committee. These bills supported by the coalition did not make much progress through the legislature, despite constant lobbying pressure from VFHF members as a continuation of their“2.5 Cents to Common Sense” campaign.Prospects in the House, controlled by Republicans, were unfavorable after the 2003 session due to increased anti-tax and anti-tobacco-control ideology measures, became even more unfavorable after the 2003 session, especially considering the dismal performance of tax-increase bills in the 2003 session.According to Cathleen Grzesiek, the head of the coalition in 2009, Virginia legislators were unwilling to consider a tax increase until Warner chose to propose it in the 2004 budget.Also, the support of Sen. John Chichester , who was President Pro Tem of the Senate and chair of the powerful Senate Finance Committee at the time, influenced the legislature.Polling in 2004 funded by VFHF and conducted by the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids , the primary source for technical assistance for VFHF and an advisory group to the VFHF Steering Committee,helped tobacco control advocates advance their positions in favor of increasing the excise tax on tobacco products. In February 2004, TFK contracted the poll to Mason-Dixon Polling, and the survey demonstrated high support for an increase in the cigarette tax for a second year in a row: 71% of respondents supported a 75 cent tax increase.VFHF issued a press release highlighting the results, and stressed that increasing the cigarette tax would be a “win-win” situations for legislators and public health.

A commissioned by TFK analyzed the fiscal and economic consequences of a 50 cent tax increase on Virginia. The report, prepared by Brian Gottlob of the PolEcon Research group,was designed to be presented to legislators and Governor Warner to debunk several of the industry’s arguments about the negative effects of an increase. Notably, the report demonstrated that despite a decline in sales, a cigarette tax increase generally is followed by an increase of state revenue that more than offsets the decline in sales. The report also showed that despite arguments to the contrary, the burden of a cigarette tax mainly falls on households with incomes of $30,000 or more. Perhaps most important to Virginia, with Richmond’s Philip Morris manufacturing presence, was a finding that an increase in excise taxes corresponds with very small changes in overall employment in the state. The report found that a 10% decline in sales would lead to only a 0.1% change in retail employment. Several bills advanced different excise tax increase proposals during the 2004 Special Session I, but ultimately it was HB 5018, the Omnibus Tax Bill, proposed by Del. Harry Parrish that became the vehicle for the actual tax increase of 30 cents. HB 5018 increased taxes generally, including gasoline and car registration as well as tobacco products . The revenue created by the increased tobacco taxes was to be placed in the Virginia Health Care Trust Fund , created by the Omnibus Tax Bill to provide health care services. These health services were not fully defined by the Act but could include “Medicaid payments, disease diagnosis, prevention and control, and community health services.” The HCTF was funded in several ways. Forty percent of all Master Settlement Agreement payments were to be deposited into the HCTF. In addition, a portion of the excise tax on individual cigarettes was paid into the HCTF. Additionally, “roll-your-own” tobacco would be taxed at10% of the sales price, and all of which went into the HCTF. HCTF funds were to be used exclusively for the health care services and the funds would not revert to the general fund at the end of each fiscal year. No provisions were made for HCTF funds to be used for tobacco prevention, control, or the treatment of tobacco-related diseases. Donna Reynolds, a member of VFHF and the community relations director for the American Lung Association of Virginia, remarked to the press in 2004 that much of the success of HB 5018 was due to the fiscal crisis in the state at the time, which created legislative support for generating revenue outside of the lobbying efforts of health advocates.However, Reynolds felt that the lobbying efforts of the tobacco control groups helped set the stage, and additionally prompted “people in leadership roles [to talk] more about what is important to our organization and to Virginians,” especially concerning the need to reduce youth smoking rates.VFHF’s efforts in this regard included face-to-face meetings between VFHF staff, lobbyists, and legislators, as well as grassroots efforts across all VFHF member organizations.

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One amendment simply replaced mistakenly deleted wording and did not change the thrust of the bill

Posted on September 4, 2023 by hemp2022

Retail stores were not included on the list of public breathing spaces and therefore, as “unprotected breathing spaces,” it was left up to the owner or manager to “develop a written policy for restricting smoking areas” and left the size of the no-smoking areas up to customer demand. Macfarlane’s SB 440 also considered restaurants to be unprotected breathing spaces, leaving no-smoking areas up to the discretion of the proprietor in contrast to HB 562 and SB 150, which required 40% of a restaurant’s seating capacity to be smoke-free. Macfarlane admitted to the press that he would not support retail restrictions at all, characterizing them as “an invasion of privacy rights.”His introduction of a weak bill, SB 440, was consistent with the industry strategy of enacting a weak bill to prevent the potential passage of a stronger one. With the Virginia affiliates of the voluntary health organizations supporting a different bill than their former allies Michie and Cohen, the health advocacy position was in disarray. It was in this environment that the tobacco industry decided to introduce its own bill, SB 486, sponsored by Sen. Virgil Goode . The bill was specifically represented to the public and press as a moderate bill compared to the GASP-supported bills, and was introduced by concerned industry-aligned elements, in order to head off what was feared to be a rout by tobacco control interests. Michie and Cohen felt that they had enough votes to pass their legislation, and these comments were exploited by the tobacco industry as an excuse to introduce Goode’s bill as a “moderate” alternative to the stronger Michie and Cohen bills.Soon after being introduced, Cohen’s SB 150 was referred to the Senate Education and Health Committee. There it survived an attempted amendment that sought to weaken the bill by adding preemption language. In reaction to this success, Macfarlane allowed industry lobbyists to draft the new provisions for SB 440 according to David Bailey, a VCIA lobbyist.These new provisions drew directly from the industry-supported SB 486 and eliminated the “protected breathing spaces” language that allowed more stringent local ordinances for “public breathing spaces,” hydroponic shelf and included instead standard industry preemption language that disallowed localities from passing local ordinances stronger than the statewide law.

Despite his willing adoption of the new language, some health advocates such as Lucy Blackford, associate director of the ALA, felt that Macfarlane was still making a good-faith attempt to move forward; however, the preemption language he had utilized did alienate the health groups.According to Blackford, Macfarlane may have adopted industry-supported preemption language to ensure passage of his bill, not realizing that the industry language would so damage the bill’s support from health advocates.Others, like David Bailey, questioned the need for such a move “when the votes were there” along with health groups’ support.After adopting the industry language, 11 out of the 13 co-sponsors of Macfarlane’s bill withdrew their support.The result was that any distinction between the Macfarlane and Goode bills was further eroded, as SB 440 had been amended with language derived from SB 486. SB 440 then became the leading bill for the industry and Goode lent his support to promoting it. This led the health groups to drop their support of SB 440, shifting their support behind Michie’s SB 150.Michie publically questioned Macfarlane’s decision, with Michie stating to the Roanoke Times “I’m astounded that the senator from Roanoke [Macfarlane] has the temerity to support this bill thrust upon him by the tobacco industry.”In early February, Macfarlane’s bill failed to pass its third reading in the Senate by a 21- 18 vote. Donley credited this to Sen. Michie, whose bill had passed the Senate a few days before, stood up and “put his personality, his reputation on the line” to kill the bill.Macfarlane’s bill was immediately reconsidered and defeated again, preventing it from being revived in the same year. While Goode’s bill was still alive in committee, it seemed unlikely to pass due to its similarity to Macfarlane’s bill.This situation left Michie’s bill the only one to have a reasonable prospect of success in the Senate. At this point, the Tri-Agency Council threw their support behind Michie’s bill, mobilizing grassroots support. Early in the 1990 session, Del. C. Richard Cranwell , chair of the powerful House Finance Committee, introduced HB 1055 which was promoted as a limited preemption repeal. But after the death of SB 440, HB 1055 was amended with a substitute bill, transforming it into a vehicle for tobacco industry language.The only statewide protection against smoking that HB 1055 provided was that government-owned buildings must provide reasonable no-smoking areas. Most importantly, the new substitute bill preempted local ordinances and presented mandatory provisions that local ordinances must include.

The bill also stated that any local ordinance must provide that where smoking was permissible, a building’s owner or manager would be exclusively responsible for designating no-smoking areas. The changes to HB 1055 satisfied no one, causing an immediate uproar from most tobacco control advocates and industry representatives alike. HB 562 was considered by the tobacco industry to be the most threatening of the bills being carried in the General Assembly because it did not include preemption and encouraged local ordinances to exceed the standards it set. It was aggressively opposed by the industry. RJ Reynolds , in response to HB 562 being reported out of the House General Laws Committee to the House floor on February 12, made phone calls to smokers and local smokers’ groups as well as industry allies such as outdoor billboard advertisers, customers, tobacco growers, and hospitality groups. All were asked to make phone calls to legislators in opposition of HB 562. The bill was subsequently defeated on the House floor by a vote of 57-40 in the face of significant industry pressure.After the defeat of HB 562, Cohen and Michie tried to block Cranwell’s bill, but in the end both sides felt the need to compromise, so Cranwell agreed to meet with Cohen in an attempt to work out a bill agreeable to both sides. One of the main points of contention involved which part of the code the bill would be part of. Cohen and Michie wanted the bills to be part of the health code , meaning that if the law were ever modified, it would first have to go through the health committees, generally favorable to tobacco control legislation, and bypass the hostile local government committees in both the House and the Senate. Cranwell sought to house the bill in the local government section of the code , ensuring it would end up in those committees.Cranwell ultimately prevailed, and both SB 105 and HB 1055 added new language in the local government section of the code. On February 14, 1990, Cranwell’s bill passed the House by an overwhelming majority of 92-5. With no health-group-supported bills left, Del. Cohen endorsed the bill, stating, “It’s better to have half a loaf than no loaf at all.”Part of Cohen’s support for Cranwell’s bill was an agreement by health advocates and their legislative allies not to pursue stronger language or revisions to the bill for two years.This tendency for legislative allies of the health groups to compromise in order to pass a bill would foreshadow legislative attitudes about tobacco control in the future,mobile shelving system hampering advocates of strong bills and setting the stage for future half-measures and compromises.

A similar situation played out in another tobacco-growing state, South Carolina, during the same year.South Carolina’s tobacco industry lobbyists convinced health advocates to support a weak statewide law, which resulted in a lopsided compromise that strongly benefitted the tobacco industry. The health groups were motivated by a feeling that statewide support for a clean indoor air law was strong, and that they had to capitalize on this positive sentiment or lose their opportunity to get anything passed . The tobacco industry was in a position of strength in South Carolina, losing nothing if a statewide law did not pass, but being in a strong position to dictate the terms of any compromise agreement. This was also true of the tobacco industry in Virginia. Ultimately, with the support of both the tobacco industry and the health groups, the South Carolina “compromise” language embodied in H 3303 and S 138 passed both houses in May 1990 and took effect in August of the same year. Opinions among the health advocates on the Cranwell bill were mixed. On one hand, some coalition advocates like the League of Women Voters and the VCIA supported the bill, with the VCIA’s lobbyist, David Bailey, stating that the coalition was “delighted” with Cranwell’s proposal, explaining that while the agency preferred the Cohen/Michie proposal, they felt positively about Cranwell’s bill.On the other hand, Anne Donley of GASP complained about the bill’s weak language.On March 2, SB 150 was amended to be identical to HB 1055. Both bills passed both houses by strong majorities on March 9, forming the basis for the final version of the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act . On March 10, however, Gov. Douglas Wilder made two amendments to the bill and sent it back to the Legislature for final approval.The other amendment was substantive, and exempted prisons from the purview of the VICAA: “The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to office, work or other areas of the Department of Corrections which are not entered by the general public in the normal course of business or use of the premises.” On April 18, the Legislature approved Gov. Wilder’s amendments, and Wilder signed the bill into law on April 25th. . The law went into effect July 1, 1990. Almost immediately after passage, both health advocates and industry representatives sought to define the provisions of the bill as favorable to their interests as well as set the tone for enforcement. In April 1990, the Tobacco Institute opened the debate by observing to reporters that the 1990 bill was a boon for the tobacco industry and that “Virginia’s sensible level of accommodation is a model for the rest of the country.”The Tobacco Institute also took credit for the VICAA. For example, Page Sutherland, a regional director for the Tobacco Institute, accurately stated to the press that “Most of the provisions of the law we enacted are taken from pieces of legislation that we introduced.”Tobacco Institute representatives also took the initiative to produce interpretive guidelines for the public and proprietors of venues covered by the new law. Health advocates responded defensively about the Tobacco Institute’s moves by referring to them as public relations ploys serving as “damage control,” and, inaccurately, pointing to the new law as a strong one. Jane Roberts, a spokesperson for the VCIA, said to the press that “This is the strongest measure among the top tobacco-producing states in the nation,” a statement that was true in a technical sense but ignored the weak provisions of the bill, such as preemption.Early in the 1991 legislative session, Del. Cohen and Sen. Michie introduced legislation, HB 1796 and SB 815, to clarify the enforcement provisions of the VICAA. The industry responded strongly, claiming that instead of the minor technical revision that the proponents claimed, the bills represented a violation of the agreement between health advocates and the tobacco industry not to amend the law for two years. Originally, both bills sought to declare that the penalty for violating the VICAA was civil in nature, allowing the private citizen complainants to go to a civil court to file the complaint. In addition, the Commonwealth Attorney could participate in the enforcement action. The aim was to continue to allow private citizens to take direct action through the court system, as Anne Donley had previously done.Soon afterwards, the House version was amended so that city and county attorneys and not Commonwealth attorneys enforce the law. Eventually, the Legislature adjourned before the bill could pass, effectively killing it. The companion bill, SB 815, had died in the Senate Education and Health Committee almost a month earlier.We were unable to locate any actions by the health groups to support either of these bills. The tobacco industry put significant pressure on the Legislature during this period.

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A corporate tax bill including a tobacco quota buyout as an amendment was passed in the U.S.

Posted on September 1, 2023 by hemp2022

Despite the decreasing importance of domestic tobacco farming to the tobacco industry, tobacco growers represented an important source of legitimacy for the tobacco manufacturers’ political goals. Therefore, despite the increasing divergence between the two groups, maintaining a seemingly close relationship was beneficial to the tobacco companies because, as one Philip Morris representative put it in 1990, “local growers have more credibility in legislatures than do hired guns.”The importance of the relationship also extended outside of merely legitimizing their lobbying efforts, resonating in the public sphere as an important public relations tool. Thus it was in the tobacco industry’s best interest to maintain an appearance of commonality with tobacco growers, despite the underlying tensions over quotas. In the late 1990s, several proposals circulated in the federal government to eliminate the quota system, all of which would have included a “quota buyout” to compensate existing quota holders . Tobacco manufacturers preferred to maintain the quota and price support systems, because the system gave them considerable flexibility and control over the market with the fall back of the price support system for growers. Manufacturers argued that the cost of eliminating the program and compensating quota holders would have exceeded the amount gained for manufacturers by lower prices achieved without a price support system. The disparate positions of growers and manufacturers over the regulation of the tobacco market was the root of a series of conflicts between 1997 and 2004 which distanced tobacco companies from their traditional grower allies.The changing attitudes of tobacco growers in Virginia did result in the formation of the Southern Communities Tobacco Project ,racking company a dialogue between farmers and tobacco control advocates intended to find common ground.

This dialogue led to an understanding between farmers and advocates that MSA money would be spent both on tobacco community revitalization and restrictions on youth access to tobacco. At the same time, health groups nationwide began to push for the inclusion of tobacco within the regulatory purview of the federal Food and Drug Administration . Health groups, particularly the Washington DC-based Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids and the voluntary health organizations leveraged the distance between tobacco growers and tobacco manufacturers over a quota buyout to garner growers’ support for FDA regulation of tobacco products in exchange for support of a quota buyout. Building tobacco control alliances with growers increased the impression among tobacco growers that their interests were divergent from those of manufacturers. Public health groups had already begun a partnership with tobacco growers at the urging of President Bill Clinton to find ways to limit smoking while protecting tobacco producing communities, resulting in the March 1998 Core Principles document to that effect signed by prominent grower and public health organizations.The first serious consideration of a tobacco quota buyout took place within the context of the 1997 proposed “global tobacco settlement” of multi-state lawsuits against the tobacco companies seeking compensation for Medicaid expenditures of tobacco-related illnesses. This “global tobacco settlement” took the form of the U.S. Senate’s consideration of the controversial “McCain bill,” which was eventually defeated, setting the foundation for the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998. The McCain bill would have included both FDA regulation of tobacco and a quota buyout plan as well as de facto immunity from future lawsuits for the manufacturers. Tobacco companies secured the support of many tobacco growing organizations to join them in opposing the McCain bill and its quota buyout provisions by promising a $28 billion payout to growers under a separate settlement.

The McCain bill failed to pass and was replaced by the private Master Settlement Agreement , which included a separate settlement between manufacturers and tobacco growers, known as Phase II, to compensate growers for potential loss of revenue associated with the MSA’s provisions. However, under the MSA’s Phase II payments to tobacco growers, the growing community was to receive only $5.2 billion, not the promised $28 billion. This failure by tobacco manufacturers to stand by their agreement with growers led to the first major break of the manufacturer-grower organization alliance. In December 1999, tobacco farmers filed a classaction lawsuit against cigarette manufacturers, DeLoach vs. Philip Morris, alleging that the tobacco companies misled farmers when they encouraged them to oppose the removal of the quota system and accused manufacturers of rigging the federal price support system to keep prices low. This suit was settled by Philip Morris and other major tobacco companies in 2003 and by RJR in 2004, after 175,000 tobacco farmers had joined the suit, providing approximately $254 million to those growers .In March 2000, Philip Morris exacerbated existing tensions with growers by announcing that it had developed a direct contract system for purchasing burley tobacco, under which they would arrange to buy a set amount of tobacco from a specific grower at a set price, circumventing the Tobacco Price Support Program by setting the price and purchasing the tobacco prior to the tobacco reaching federally-controlled auctions. The direct contract system provided little protection and high risks for farmers compared with the federal tobacco program, and the expansion of this program would undermine the quota and price support system further by manipulating both supply and demand outside the system. Philip Morris began executing this system in 2000 over opposition by most growers and grower organizations. It was not until 2004 that a bill ending the federal tobacco program made significant headway.

House of Representatives in early 2004, generating a significant push by public health advocates partnering with tobacco growers to pass a buyout bill that would include FDA regulation of tobacco as well as a quota buyout. The final version of the federal tobacco quota buyout passed in October 2004 and dismantled the 70-year-old price support, tobacco quota and allotment system. In exchange, quota holders received $10 per pound of their 2002 quota, with $7 to quota holders and $3 to growers if the allotment had been leased. This amounted to a total $10.1 billion buyout.The buyout resulted in a shift to fewer, larger tobacco farms and therefore fewer individual growers directly engaged in tobacco growing. It also led tobacco grower organizations to actively oppose the tobacco industry’s lobbying force and instead partner with public health groups over a tobacco control measure, FDA regulation. Both of these factors had a tangible effect on tobacco growers’ opinions of tobacco control and of the tobacco companies. Research on North Carolina tobacco growers’ attitudes towards tobacco control, public health and tobacco manufacturers quantified this shift. It showed that tobacco farmers’ perceived public health and tobacco control efforts as 7.5 times more threatening in 1997 as in 2005, that tobacco farmers decreasingly associated tobacco companies’ interests with their own and that they increasingly perceived risk from foreign tobacco production. Additionally, a 2005 survey of North Carolina tobacco growers and ex-tobacco growers indicated that 80 percent would be neutral or actively support comprehensive tobacco-free school policies.Nationwide and in Virginia, the net effect on farmers was that many immediately stopped producing tobacco. Moreover, the remaining production was consolidated on fewer but larger farms. Finally, some Virginia production of flue-cured tobacco,tierer rack free from the geographical constraints of the quota system, moved to regions with lower production costs such as North Carolina.As far as impact on tobacco control advocacy, the MSA’s quota buyout provisions gave the tobacco companies an excuse to divert significant funds away from tobacco control measures and into tobacco community revitalization, which was intended by the tobacco industry to placate tobacco farming interests. In Virginia the tobacco farming organizations did not publically break lockstep with the tobacco industry and continued to support industry tactics to oppose tobacco control efforts. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Virginia Farm Bureau, the Virginia Agribusiness Council, and the Virginia Wholesalers Association worked closely with Philip Morris to develop a public relations measure that pretended to address youth access to tobacco. In reality, this move was intended to prevent effective youth tobacco access measures from being implemented .

This situation was different from that in South Carolina, where the animosity between tobacco growers and the tobacco industry led traditional tobacco industry allies like the Commissioners of Agriculture and the South Carolina Farm Bureau to shift to neutral positions on tobacco control efforts.South Carolina legislators representing tobacco-growing regions also became less hostile towards tobacco control legislation.All of these factors fundamentally weakened the tobacco industry in South Carolina and it could no longer dominate the tobacco control debate in South Carolina.Unlike South Carolina, however, the formation of the SCTP did not lead legislators representing tobacco-growing regions to become less hostile towards tobacco control, and did not cause any major tobacco grower association to shift to a neutral position on tobacco control. Tobacco manufacturers in Virginia remained able to control the dialogue on tobacco control despite the diminished presence of tobacco manufacturing in the state and the strains in their relationships with tobacco growers nationwide. This does not preclude the possibility that these divisions may occur in the future, and if they do, tobacco control advocates in Virginia should exploit them. The national nonsmokers’ rights movement began in the early 1970s, with loose networks of grassroots activism. The most prevalent among these loose networks was the Group to Alleviate Smoking in Public . Early successes occurred in Arizona in 1973 when smoking was restricted in a limited number of public places like elevators, libraries, and theaters.Minnesota mandated separate smoking areas in restaurants in 1975.In 1977, Beverly Hills passed a city ordinance mandating separate no-smoking sections in restaurants and restricting smoking in indoor public spaces.On May 15, 1978, Newport News passed a city ordinance that prohibited smoking in elevators, healthcare facilities, cultural facilities and public schools. There were exceptions, primarily to allow smoking areas in parts of restaurants, in theater lobbies, and in some in-patient sleeping facilities.While the mayor of Newport News, Joseph Ritchie, opposed the ordinance as an intrusion on personal liberty, other city officials supported the move after hearing from emphysema victims during the council meeting. Tobacco industry representatives were present to speak against the ordinance, but it was passed by a vote of 4-3.The law went into effect on May 25,but enforcement was lax. The city attorney for Newport News allowed restaurants to set aside just one table as a no-smoking area to avoid being fined for noncompliance.The next month, in June, restaurant owner Phyllis Alford was fined $10 for refusing to post the sign required by the city’s ordinance designating a no-smoking section. Appearing in court, Ms. Alford pled guilty because, as she put it, “I’m not going to stand up and lie. I refused to put up the sign.”Her refusal was based on an argument that the requirement was unconstitutional, an argument that eventually reached the Supreme Court of Virginia in the case Alford v. Newport News.Alford was represented by several attorneys including Charles Morgan, Jr. of Charles Morgan, Jr. and Associates. Morgan worked closely with the Tobacco Institute, attending at least two of their Executive Committee meetings.At the 64th Meeting of the Tobacco Institute Executive Committee, Morgan spoke about contemporary efforts to restrict smoking, and “commented that the approach of some of the anti-smoking groups might well be described as ‘fumiphobia,’ and he indicated that he would consider possible methods to reply to some of the current anti-smoking campaigns.”It is not clear whether the Tobacco Institute or other tobacco industry organizations paid for Ms. Alford’s defense, but her attorneys were closely aligned with tobacco industry views. In the decision of Alford, handed down on November 21, 1979, the state Supreme Court found that Newport News’ police power “may not be used to regulate property interests unless the means employed are reasonably suited to the achievement of that goal.”The court found the enforcement of the ordinance, merely allowing one table to satisfy the no-smoking area requirement, was “not reasonably suited to the achievement of the legislative goal” of protecting the health of restaurant goers from toxic smoke exposure. Furthermore, the signs required by the ordinance could “lead the non-smoking diner to expect the place he has chosen to patronize is a wholly protected environment,” when in fact that diner would be almost certainly be exposed to smoke because of the city’s enforcement of the ordinance. Due to these factors, the court held that in this specific case, the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police powers, because the sign posting requirement was held to be an unreasonable regulation of the use of private property.

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Why Does Vertical Farming Reduce Greenhouse Gases

Posted on August 31, 2023 by hemp2022

Vertical farming has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared to traditional agricultural methods due to several key factors:

  1. Reduced Transportation: Vertical farms are often located closer to urban centers,rolling shelf rack where the demand for fresh produce is high. This proximity reduces the need for long-distance transportation of food from rural farms to urban markets. Transportation, especially when involving trucks or planes, contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions.
  2. Energy-Efficient Lighting: Vertical farms rely on artificial lighting systems, usually LED lights, to provide the necessary light for plant growth. These LED lights are designed to emit specific wavelengths that plants need for photosynthesis. Unlike traditional outdoor farming that relies on sunlight, vertical farms can tailor their lighting to the exact needs of plants, resulting in less wasted energy and reduced emissions.
  3. Controlled Climate: Vertical farms maintain a controlled environment with precise temperature, humidity, and CO2 levels. This reduces the need for excess heating or cooling that can lead to energy waste in traditional open-field agriculture, which relies on the natural climate.
  4. Water Efficiency: Vertical farming systems, such as hydroponics and aeroponics, use water more efficiently than soil-based farming. Water can be recirculated within the system, reducing overall consumption and the energy required to pump and distribute water.
  5. Reduced Pesticide and Fertilizer Use: In controlled indoor environments, vertical farms are less prone to pest infestations and diseases, reducing the need for chemical pesticides. Additionally, the precise delivery of nutrients to plants in hydroponic systems minimizes excess fertilizer use, which can lead to emissions of nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas.
  6. Carbon Capture Opportunities: In some designs, vertical farms can incorporate carbon capture technology, which involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the air and using it to enhance plant growth. This not only increases plant productivity but also helps mitigate atmospheric CO2 levels, a key driver of climate change.
  7. Recycling and Resource Efficiency: Vertical farming can implement efficient waste management practices, such as composting organic waste or recycling nutrient solutions. This minimizes the release of methane, a potent greenhouse gas, from decomposing organic matter in landfills.
  8. Land Conservation: Traditional agriculture often leads to deforestation and land conversion, marijuana grow system which releases stored carbon into the atmosphere. Vertical farming’s ability to produce food in a smaller footprint can help preserve natural ecosystems and reduce carbon emissions from land use change.

While vertical farming holds promise for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it’s important to note that the overall environmental impact depends on factors such as the energy sources used, the efficiency of the farming systems, and the life cycle assessment of the materials used in construction. To maximize the benefits, vertical farms should strive to integrate renewable energy sources, energy-efficient technologies, and sustainable farming practices.

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Martz’ office responded to the health advocates’ criticisms through a statement to the press

Posted on August 30, 2023 by hemp2022

It is also likely that newspaper coverage of the billboard spread its message to a wider audience, though it seemed to have little effect on the next budget hearing before the House Committee on Appropriations. At the March 5, 2001 hearing before the House Committee on Appropriations, Rep. Christine Kaufman moved to restore the $6 million to the TUPP that was being cut under Martz’ proposed budget.Kaufman asserted that Montanans had expressed a desire for MSA money to be spent on tobacco prevention by voting for the MSA health trust, and Rep. Rosalie Buzzas expressed her support for the motion. In supporting Gov. Martz’ proposed budget, Committee Vice-Chair Rep. Dave Lewis countered that money was scarce, and that the tobacco prevention program would still have federal funds of $1 million in addition to the $500,000 per year from the MSA. Lewis argued that the reduced TUPP budget would allow the state to maintain other worthwhile programs, stating “it’s simply a matter of priorities.”Montana residents, anti-tobacco groups, and the health organizations continued their efforts to convince the legislators to maintain prior funding levels for tobacco prevention programs. On March 7, 2001, about 200 people converged on the Capitol to urge the 2001 Legislature to add money to the state’s Tobacco Use Prevention Program proposed budget.The Helena Independent Record reported that “to drive their message home, supporters of the program… filled the Capitol with 1,400 daffodils, four to a vase. The total represents the number of people who die each year in Montana of tobacco-related illnesses; the distribution stands for the four people who die each day.”The article also reported that “[o]n placards standing around the rotunda down the hall from the governor’s office,racks shelves several dozen Montanans posted messages on what rally organizers called the ‘Wall of Hope.’”Health advocates continued to make their arguments to reporters covering the March 7, 2001 rally.

Jeri Domme, a member of the Governor’s Advisory Council representing the American Heart Association, explained that reduction of the TUPP budget by more than 80% would essentially eliminate the program. Dr. Shepard, Advisory Council member representing the American Lung Association, criticized the elected officials who failed to support tobacco prevention, asking ,“How big does the number have to be before we get people’s attention?” and “how much money does it have to cost?.”In response the criticisms made by rally attendees, Mary Jo Fox, Communications Director for the Governor, told reporters that Gov. Martz had not changed her mind about funding the prevention program at $500,000 a year. Fox asserted that tobacco prevention was a low priority in a fiscally tight period, saying “in a year where funds are scarce, choices have to be made,” and that though she thought tobacco prevention was a good program, “we don’t have funds for it at this time.”Local news continued to report the criticisms made by health advocates about Gov. Martz’ handling of the tobacco use prevention budget. In an April 3, 2003 article by the Associated Press, Dr. Robert Shepard, stated that the state officials “have failed to address the leading cause of preventable death in Montana,” and that “for this program to be cut by 86% is outrageous.”The article also quoted Joan Miles, Director of Lewis and Clark County Health Department, who said that “…it would be disgraceful if we would accept tobacco settlement dollars without appropriating some of them to preventing disease and death.”The Associated Press story was carried by state newspapers, the Helena Independent Record and the Billings Gazette.Gov. The administration’s statement said that Martz had made her position clear in January: “Tobacco use prevention is a worthy cause, but will have to make due with $1 million [for the 2002-2003 biennium] in tight fiscal times.”The Governor’s press secretary, Anastasia Burton, reiterated the claim to reporters that the governor believed in the tobacco use prevention program.

The Governor’s claims of believing in tobacco use prevention program, however, were inconsistent to previous statements, in which she told the Governor’s Advisory Council on Tobacco Use Prevention that she was reducing prevention funds because the program lacked results. The Governor’s statement also said that the reduced budget was based on her belief that $1 million was adequate to get the job done, even though all state officials involved with the TUPP believed that the program might be eliminated due to her funding proposals. Indeed, Drew Dawson, Chief of the Health Systems Bureau of the DPHHS which directly oversaw the tobacco-use prevention program, stated in February 2001 that it was unclear what the department could accomplish with such a dramatic reduction in funding.State health advocates held a press conference in Helena on April 9, 2001 to continue their public criticisms of Martz’ proposed tobacco prevention budget cuts, as well the support Republican legislators had given to the cuts. At the press conference, representatives from the American Heart Association, American Cancer Society, and the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids made public statements around a table topped by 4 body bags, symbolizing the 4 people each day that die in Montana from tobacco-related illness.American Heart Association Lobbyist Cliff Christians stated that the Governor and Legislature were failing to adequately support tobacco use prevention, but that there was still time to increase proposed funding for the TUPP.Kristen Page Nei with the American Cancer Society called the administrations budget constraints argument “hogwash” and “downright insulting.”Nei pointed out that the 60% of the MSA money not dedicated to the trust fund was in the state for the purpose of addressing tobacco use prevention, and was “not intended to balance the budget.”Gov. Martz met with the Governor’s Advisory Council on Tobacco Use Prevention on April 12, 2001. During the 40 minute meeting, Gov. Martz told the Advisory Council “I don’t want to argue with you. I believe in what you’re doing,” and that “I believe in the programs, I just don’t have the money.”184 Again, the Governor contradicted assertions made earlier in the year that she did not believe the programs worked.

Members of the Advisory Council repeated arguments they had been making since December 2000: that the program was not given enough time to show results, that tobacco related illness was a major health danger, and that cutting the TUPP budget by $6 million would effectively eliminate the program. Gov. Martz, now claiming she wholeheartedly believed in tobacco prevention, responded by putting all of the blame on a budget constraints: “I believe every word your saying. I can understand why you’re so adamant about it… I’m not heartless. I’m not a cold blooded person. But I have a whole state to find an ending fund balance for.”Advisory Council members at the April 12, 2001 meeting also repeated the suggestion that the state could raise money as well as reduce the smoking rate by raising the tax on cigarettes. Martz rejected the idea,vertical dispensary reasserting her pledge not to raise any taxes.Martz did offer to help the council find additional money in the private sector, but made clear that unless the state discovered new revenue, tobacco-use prevention spending would not be increased. Already at risk of elimination from drastically reduced funding, the Tobacco Use Prevention Program was further weakened on April 18, 2001, when Senate Finance Chairman Robert Keenan  moved that the House-Senate Conference Committee transfer the entire program and its funding out of the Department of Health and Human Services and into the Montana Interagency Coordinating Council for State Prevention Programs.The ICC was physically housed in the DPHSS, but was administratively attached to the governor’s office, which would directly supervise its members. The ICC was created by Legislative statute in 1993 for the purpose of creating and sustaining a comprehensive system of prevention services in the state of Montana. The ICC was comprised of ten Montana state agency directors, the Lieutenant Governor, and two persons appointed by the Governor who had experience in prevention programs and services.Among the goals of the ICC were to reduce the rates of child abuse, drug abuse, high school drop-outs, violent crime, and teen pregnancy in the state.

On April 18, 2001, the House-Senate Conference Committee voted unanimously to move the $1 million in state funds and about $2 million more in federal disease-prevention money from the fledgling Tobacco Use Prevention Program in the DPHSS, and into the Gov. Martz controlled ICC. Senate Finance Chairman Keenan, in explaining his motion to move the program, reasoned that the governor’s office already had vast resources to tackle prevention efforts, and he believed that government prevention programs were being duplicated.The day after the House-Senate Conference Committee vote, on April 19, 2001, the Helena Independent Record observed that this likely meant the elimination of a long effort by public health advocates for a fully funded, separate and high-profile anti-tobacco campaign in the state.To the surprise of the state health advocates, tobacco use prevention efforts would now be one of the several programs run through the ICC; in addition, the reduced budget for tobacco prevention was approved by the legislature on April 21, 2001.Shortly after the Legislature restructured the state tobacco prevention programs, it was announced that Gov. Martz might let the Governor’s Advisory Council on Tobacco Use Prevention sunset after its two-year term ended in September 2001.Although the administration claimed to reporters on April 24, 2001 that it had not made a final decision on the Advisory Council’s fate, Ken Pekoc, a public information officer for the DPHHS, told reporters that his department had prepared a draft letter informing members of the demise of the Advisory Council. According to Pekoc, the letter was then changed on April 24, 2001 into a list of pros and cons regarding the council that was released to the public.Mary Jo Fox, Communication Director for the Governor, denied that she or the Governor had seen the letter, and claimed that the Governor was awaiting a recommendation from DPHSS Director Gail Gray before making a decision about the council.190 It was reported in an April 24, 2001 Helena Independent Record article that Gray herself had not yet made a recommendation to the governor, though she was likely to suggest eliminating the Advisory Council because of reduced funding and restructuring. The DPHHS Director made no comment on the draft letter informing of the Council’s demise, which was allegedly prepared by her own department.Communications Director Fox claimed that the Governor was not looking for retribution against Council members who criticized here actions, but was reacting to the Legislature’s wishes regarding the program funds and structures. Such a justification contradicted the history of the conflict between Martz and health advocates, however, since it was Martz herself who originally recommended reducing the Tobacco Use Prevention Program budget.Council members said they were not surprised by the Governor’s decision. In reaction, Dr. Shepard told reporters that, “it is not a reasonable approach to throw out the expertise of 24 volunteer members who have been working hard on this program,”Dr. John Hauxwell, another member of the Advisory Council who represented the Indian Health Service, told the press that the council was being eliminated because “[w]e were a burr under [Gov. Martz’] saddle reminding her that she was backing way from what’s essentially a public health crisis.”Though the contentious relationship between anti-tobacco advocates and Gov. Martz was well known and widely reported by the local press, it should also be noted that conflicts with Gov. Martz were not exclusive to tobacco control advocates. On April 25, 2001, the Center of Environment Politics , a Montana-based political watchdog group established in 1998, held a news conference on the steps of the state Capitol to criticize Gov. Martz’ administration.The CEP charged that the first 100 days of Gov. Martz’ administration were marked by a lack of openness, inclusiveness and accountability, though the governor’s spokeswoman dismissed the criticism as little more than a rally hosted by the Montana Democratic Party.

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The sole opponent testifying at the hearing was Speaker of the House John Mercer

Posted on August 29, 2023 by hemp2022

The combined opposition against HB 131 resulted in a 42-57 defeat.In explaining her opposition to HB 131, Swanson explained that “Democrats believe it is more important to fund health care programs for Montanans than it is to give multinational corporations tax breaks,” and that Democrats wanted to send a message: “We didn’t want to go out of here saying we approved of any of it. That money was never intended for tax relief.”Swanson also gave indications that she believed MSA money could be more successfully allocated through other bills, and expressed confidence that MSA spending for tobacco use prevention and health care could be added to the bill that allocates the budget for all state government departments, House Bill 2.106 Indeed, Swanson would unsuccessfully attempt to achieve the same MSA allocations specified in HB 131 with another bill she sponsored, HB 240. Swanson would also propose allocations of MSA money for tobacco use prevention and health programs under HB 2, the state general allocation bill, would become one of most debated issues at the end of the 1999 session. The state Democratic and Republican parties became more polarized over the spending of MSA money, and the degree of cooperation between them further deteriorated, with the attempted passage of House Bill 240. HB 240, sponsored by House Minority Leader Emily Swanson would have created a 5-year tax credit for individual and small business employers as an incentive to provide health care to employees.Also within the bill, though it was not indicated in the bill’s title,flood tables for greenhouse was a provision specifying that “[f]unds deposited in the tobacco settlement trust fund account may be used only to provide refunds to employers providing health care benefits pursuant to [HB 240],” thereby excluding all other uses of MSA funds.

When the first hearing regarding HB 240 took place before the House Joint Select Committee on Jobs and Income on January 11, 1999, Swanson’s description of the bill and all proponent testimony , and representatives from the Montana’s Framer’s Union, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Union, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, focused heavily on the need to provide health care to employees of smaller business, and the inability of lower wage workers to pay for medical services.None of the proponent testimony mentioned that HB 240 excluded all other uses of the MSA money, and no opponents to HB 240 testified.The House Committee on Jobs and Income passed the bill on January 19, 1999, and referred it to the House Committee on Taxation for review.At the February 1, 1999 hearing for HB 240 before the House Committee on Taxation, many of the same proponents again testified, and were joined by representatives from the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Federation of Small Business Association, and the Montana Association of Health Care Providers Association, along with some individual business owners.The lack of affordable health care and medical services for low income workers was reiterated as the main focus in proponent testimony.Again, no mention was made of the HB 240 provision that excluded all other uses of MSA money, and no opponents to HB 240 testified. HB 240 was passed in the House Taxation Committee on March 29, 1999, and sent to the full senate for consideration.HB 240 passed in the House by a vote of 88 to 12 on March 30, 1999.The next day, April 1, 1999, the Billings Gazette and the Associated Press reported that the provision in HB 240 making MSA money exclusive to its purposes had unknowingly slipped by Republican legislators.Swanson admitted to reporters that she intentionally omitted any mention of the MSA provision in hopes that she could keep the bill alive, stating, “I didn’t want to give them [Republican legislators] an excuse to kill the bill,” and believed that HB 240 had a better chance of being passed if it reached the Senate.Most Democrats felt that the intended and most appropriate use of the MSA money was for health care programs, and Swanson asserted that the tax incentives under HB 240, which would increase health care insurance among low and middle wage workers, fit well with that intent, stating that “[i]f this isn’t health care, what is?” Swanson also expressed her belief that HB 240 would prevent Republicans from diverting MSA money to non-health related programs such as corporate tax relief.In response to reporters who wondered how representatives could vote for HB 240 without being aware of the language the exclusively allocated all of the MSA money, House Speaker John Mercer stated, “[t]hat issue didn’t come up,” and that “it slipped through.” Mercer also expressed his belief that the MSA money was meant for tax relief, as well as for health care programs.On April 13, 1999, the Senate Committee on Taxation held a hearing on HB 240, where sponsor Emily Swanson revealed what appeared to be a long developed strategy to reintroduce the MSA allocations that had failed to pass in HB 131 . Swanson’s testimony in favor of the bill was joined by proponents State Auditor Mark O’Keefe and representatives of the National Federation of Independent Businesses and the Montana Farmer’s Union.At the hearing, Swanson proposed amendments that would change HB 240 so that the MSA allocations were very similar to those set out in failed HB 131: 30% would be deposited in the general fund, with the remainder to be “appropriated by the legislature for health related programs, including but not limited to CHIP, the Montana Comprehensive Health Association, and health prevention grants.” Speaker of the House John Mercer, in testifying against HB 240 at the Senate taxation committee hearing, apologized that the bill was before the Senate, characterizing it as an attempt to reintroduce the failed proposals of HB 131 into the Senate after sneaking the MSA allocation provisions through the House. Mercer then urged the committee to remove any reference to the tobacco settlement funds, saying “if it’s a good idea, then pass it without reference to tobacco money.”Bill sponsor Swanson, in her closing statement, noted that the failure of HB 131 was that it inappropriately gave half of the MSA funds to tax relief, when it should be used for the kinds of health-related purposes which would be achieved by her proposed amendments to HB 240.Although the Senate Taxation Committee accepted Swanson’s amendments, they subsequently tabled it. That same day, April 13, 1999, Senate Democrats made a motion to take the bill out of the Tax Committee and put it before the full Senate, but the motion failed in a 20- 30 vote.In addressing the Senate after the defeat of HB 240, Senate Majority Leader John Harp said that the tobacco money would still go to pay for health programs,ebb and flow tray system including health coverage for poor children and uninsurable adults, but that those allocations would be made in the final version of House Bill 2, the chief state spending bill for the upcoming two-year budget period. Harp also made reference to the controversial MSA allocation provision in HB 240 when he told the Senate, “[w]e’re going to be up front on how we spend the tobacco money,”Senate Bill 323 was introduced on January 29, 1999 by sponsor Steve Doherty , and proposed submitting for public vote an amendment to the Montana Constitution that would require the legislature to dedicate 50% of the MSA proceeds to a permanent trust fund and the other 50% to be put into the general fund.

The amendment would have allowed the interest from the trust fund to be appropriated for health care programs, though the allocation to various programs was not specified in the bill. At the February 5, 1999 hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance and Claims, Doherty explained that the 50% division in the bill resulted from his desire to find a balance between the immediate need for funding health care and prevention programs, and a desire to safeguard the fund from future uncertainties.Other proponents of SB 323 testifying at the hearing were Chris Tweeten, Chief Counsel for the Attorney General, Art Dickhoff, representing the American Cancer Society ; and Dennis Alexander, representing the American Lung Association . Tweeton explained that a statutory trust, as opposed to a Constitutional trust, would be illusory because it could be raided when a simple majority of the legislature wanted the money. A Constitutional trust, as laid out in SB 323, would require approval of two thirds of the members of each house of the legislature. Dickhoff of the ACS, in suppoting SB 323, suggested that a portion of the money dedicated to health programs under the bill be used for a comprehensive tobacco control program, and Alexander of the ALA advised the committee that the trust would be good idea because funds would be needed for health care costs in the long term.No opponents of SB 131 testified at the hearing. The Senate Finance Committee passed the bill in a 15 to 2 vote and referred it to the Senate Public Health Committee for consideration.At the February 15, 1999 hearing for SB 323 before the Senate Committee on Public Health, Welfare and Safety, sponsor Doherty reiterated the reasoning behind the bill and was joined by proponent testimony from Attorney General Joe Mazurek and Jim Smith from the American Cancer Society.Mazurek again explained the illusory nature of a statutory trust, since it could be removed by a simple majority of the legislature, and noted that such dismantling of statutory trusts had previously occurred in Montana. Thus, Mazurek explained, a Constitutional trust was necessary to truly protect the MSA funds.The Committee on Public Health approved the bill in a 9 to 2 vote on February 18, 1999, and sent it to be heard by the full Senate. On February 22, 1999, the Senate voted against SB 323 in a 24 to 26 vote, but because it was a constitutional amendment proposal, the bill had to be heard by the full legislature, and was required to receive two-thirds support, or a combined total of 100 affirmative votes, from both House and Senate. Thus, it was required that SB 323 be voted on by the House. Since SB 323 had received only 24 votes in the Senate, it would need to receive 76 House votes to make it to the ballot.117 A hearing in the House Human Services Committee was held on March 19, 1999, where 11 proponents testified, including Attorney General Joe Mazurek and representatives of the American Lung Association of Montana, the American Cancer Society, the Montana Senior Citizen’s Association, the Montana’s Nurse’s Union, the Citizens with Tobacco Induced Diseases group, and the Better Breathers group. No opponents testified against SB 323, and the House Human Services Committee passed the bill in a 12 to 5 vote on April 9, 1999.Because the number of necessary House votes needed for passage was so high, the final vote on SB 323 was considered by reporters to be a mere formality before its ultimate failure. The members of the Republican majority in the House had already publicly expressed that the 50% set-aside in the bill was too high, and Gov. Racicot, though in favor of putting the money into a trust fund, initially was not strongly supportive of creating a constitutional trust because he wanted the MSA money available in case the state needed it in the future.Rep. Tom Zook , Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, commented to reporters that under SB 323 the state would have a large amount of money unavailable for future government programs. Zook said that “[y]ou really can’t project all the needs that are going to be there,” and that “the more flexibility you allow your future legislators, the better off you’ll be.”On April 19, 1999, the House vote on SB 323 was tied at 50 to 50, twenty-six votes short the number needed for passage. Though SB 323 failed, the idea of asking voters to put a large portion of the tobacco-settlement into a health care trust fund would return only months later, and with greater political support.

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